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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, ROCKY
WATSON, Kootenai County Sheriff, JOHN
and JANE DOES I through 13,
Defendants-Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 36861-2009
Kootenai County Docket No. 2007-7471

)
)

)
)
)
)

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD was filed by counsel for Appellant on May
21, 20 I O. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below,
fi Ie stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Surety Bond, file-stamped March 17,2008;
2. Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss, file-stamped February 3,
2009;
3. Response to Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, file-stamped February 11,2009;
4. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, file-stamped February
23,2009;
5. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider with attachment, file-stamped March
23,2009;
6. Motion to Disallow Items of Costs, file-stamped April 3, 2009;
7. Supplemental Argument in Support of Motions to Reconsider, file-stamped April 15,
2009;
8. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, file-stamped July
9,2008; and
9. Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Motion to
Reconsider, file-stamped July 16, 2008.

MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - Docket No. 36861-2009

DATED this

Jlp~ay of May 2010.
For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon,

cc: Counsel of Record
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American Contractors

Indemn~85~Wo~bWXA~ ®
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KOOTENAI

ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
PlaintIff,

vs.

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, a political subdivision of the State ofldaho,
ROCK Y WATSON, Kootenai County Sherif(, John and Jane
does I through 13

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEPUTY

(

)

Case No. _ _ _-'c::..,V:...,;;:.;07:....7:...4.;..71:.-.._ __

)
)
)
)

SECTION

)

Defendants.

11 ~ ~~
V -

)
)

UNDERTAKlNG UNDER

6-610
American Contractors Indemnity Company
9841 Airport Blvd, 9'1. Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90045

)
)

)

WHEREAS, the above named _ _ _ _ _ _ __

ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC, an Idaho Corporation

desires to

give an undertaking for _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _=-.:.;;;:;:.=_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ __ as provided in
Section _ _ _ __

6-610

NOW THEREFORE, the undersigned Surety, does hereby obligate itself; jointly and severally, to _ _ _ _ _. ::S.:.,T:;,:A.:.,TE:;:·. ::O:.:,F. .:I:;:D.:.A:;,H:.:;:O'--_ _ __

under said

statutory obligations in the sum of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND AND NOI10011lS········.;· .. ••••••••••• .. • ...... • ........
***-* .. +: t+ ********* 01: *' '* ** ** $.lII **. *-** **** *** ~C'•

IN WITNESS

WHEREOF,

•

*."' .. ,., **** **4; '" *

The corporate seal

FRANK MESTER

If:

and

·***····........·..

DoHars ($

name of the said

Surety

Company

is hereto affixed and

attested

who declares under penalty of perjury that he is its duly authorized Attorney·in-Fact acting under an

unrevoked power of attorney on file with the Clerk of the County in which above entitled Court is located.
Executed at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.::L"'O"'S"'A.::N"'G""E"'L""E"'S'--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, California on _ _ _ _ _ _ _!.:.M!!A~R.!:C::..!H~11!.>.,.::2~OO~8'___ _ _ _ __

Bond

NO. _ _ _ _ _ _IO_O_0__
79..;,S_4S__4_ _ _ _ __

TIle premium charge
500.00

$

fi)f

by

this bond is
per annum.

o
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CALIFORNIA AlL~PURPOSE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
~&~~~-:Cf'vi':W¢'&-~~-<W.@:-M~~-WM&@;y~.et:~~JW~M'dW-Gl:'MW,m

}

State at California
County of _--,L=-,O<.>S,--",AN=G""E~L""E",,-S_______

On MARCH

ll~

2008

before me,

ROCHELLE A. HILL, A NOTARY PUBLIC

Date

Her. Inserl Name and Tilte 01 Ina OHicer

personally appeared _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-.:FRANK::.==::....r;;ME:;;;s:S-i:T;:;:ERET.:::::=_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Name(s) 01 Signer(s)

who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to
be the person~ whose name~ is~ subscribed to the
within instrument and acknowledged to me that
h~h,,/.th81 executed the same in his/.hoFitloieir authorized
capacity~, and that by his,(I;JOFJ:thoif signatur~ on the
instrument the person~, or the entity upon behalf of
which the person~ acted, executed the instrument.

ROCHELLE A. HILL
CommlllSion 11 1634494

:<
I

Notory Public • California

f

L04 Angele, CO!Jnty

-

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws
of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is
true and correct
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

J. •••• ,My;O:-:':r:-:!,:2J~O J

Signature
Place Notary Seal Above

..

~~.P 1)J112- -:d ~ ~

~~~ota{YpUbl[C

OpnONAL--~--------------------Though the informarion be/ow is 110t required by law, it may prove valuable to persons relying on the document
and could prevent fraudulent removal and reattachment of this form to another document.

Description of Attached Document
Title or Type of Document:

APPEAL BOND

jJ: 1000795454

Document Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Number of Pages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Signer(s) Other Than Named Above:

Capacity(ies) Claimed by Signer(s)
Signer's Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Individual
Corporate Officer - Title(s);
Partner - 0 Limited 0 General
Attorney in Fact
Trustee
Guardian or Conservator
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Signer is Representing: _ _ _ __

Signer's

o Individual

o
Top of thumb here

Corporate Officer - Title(s): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

o Partner - 0 Limited
o Attorney in Fact
o Trustee

0 General
TopOl thumb here

o Guardian or Conservator

o

Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Signer Is Representing: _ _ _ __

~~~~~~iiii<>.,!<\0§;<XK'QC'\.;~;;~;%"""'~~_g;,."\X>.'@S~~'%_w.'{:{i(;~"'*"'%~ii?(.~~'Gl\
©2007 Nalional Notary Association· 9350 De Soto Ave" P.O. Sox 2402 "Chatsworth, CA 91313·2402" M';Iw,NationalNotawcrg Itam ftS907 Reorder: Call Toli~Free 1~800·876~6B27
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HCC Surety Group - A SubsIdiary of HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc.

HCC Surety Group
A SUBSIDIARY
.. ~b!>ut .':'~.

I.

OF

HCC

~ro.~~~~s\, '.

J

Page 1 of 1

1______-'1 Gm

Search .....

INSURANCE HOLDINGS, J:'-iC •

. careers

I

conta«:t us .

I.

agenls & brokers

I .",r"""Wi::?. .
I

-.h

I

,.,

__

t:

HCCSURETY

1.--.

O.Hb~

Login:
Password:
HCC Surety Group, established via the purchase of American Contractors Indemnity Company and

Forgot Your Pa ssword?

United States Surety Company, is the 9th largest writer of surety in the United States. HCC Surety
Group's products, including Contract. Commercia l, Court and 8ail are backed by the financial

New User? Reg ister Here

stability of our parent company, HCC Insurance Holdings , Inc. (NYSE : HeC). rated AA (Very

~----------' Strong) by Standard & Poor's and A+ (Superior) by A.M . Best Company.
Recent News
HCC Surety Group's team of underwriters, claim specialists and client service professionals

provides personal service and professional expertise to a large network of independent insurance
agents and brokers across the United States. We provide surety bonds to companies of all sizes
from sale proprie tors to large publicly-traded companies. Our
talented

group of professionals are adept at underwriting

traditional surety. In addition, our professionals possess the
knowledge and creativity to offer solutions for specialty "hard-taplace" risks often dismissed by the surety marketplace at-large .

tl10/08

<t:l200B HCC Surety Group

htto :l!www.hccsuretv.com!

Harne

I Privacy Policy I legal Notice I Site Map I About HCC

o
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3/17/2008

BCC Surety Group - A

Subsidi~ry

of HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc.

Page 1 of 1

HCC Surety Group
A SUBSID IARY OF

I "" r:: ;'=>';;; \:I, H"Zc SUaETI
O.tf"C

1_____--'1 Zl

Search ......

HCC INSURANCE H OLDINGS, INC.

Pie ase :ogin
tJelo\'t,:.J

login:
Password:
HCC Surety Group, established via the purchase of American Contractors Indemnity Company and
United States Surety Company, is the 9th largest writer of surety in the United States. HCC Surety
Forgot Your Password?
New User? Reg ister Here

Group's products, in clud ing Contract, Commercial , Co urt and Baii are backed by the financial
stability of our parent co mpany , HCC Insurance Holdings , Inc. (NY SE: HeC). rated AA (Very

~----------- Strong) by Stand ard & Poor's and A+ (Superior) by AM, Best Company,

Recent News
HCC Surety G rou p's team of underwriters, claim specialists and client service professionals
provides personal service and professional expertise to a large network of independent insurance
agents and brokers across the United States, We provide surety bonds to companies of all sizes
from sale proprietors to large publicly-traded compa nies, Our
ta lented

group of profeSSionals are adept

at underwriting

tradit io nal surety, In addition, our profeSSionals possess the
knowledge and creativity to offer solutions for specialty "hard-toplace" risks often dismissed by the surety marketplace at-large ,

1/10/08

1!:l2008 HCC Surely Group

h ome

I Privacy

Policy

I Legal

Notice

I Site Map I About

HCC
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American Contractors Indemnity Company
9841 Airport Blvd., 9tn Floor Los Angeles, California 90045

~

®

POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That American Contractors Indemnity Company of the State of California, a California corporation, does hereby appoint,

Frank Mester, Ariel T. Heredia, Tah Carazza, Brian Dahlke, or Sylvia Chang of Los Angeles, California
its true and lawful Attorney(s )-in-Fact, with full authority to execute on its behalf bonds, undertakings, recognizances and other contracts
of indemnity and writings obligatory in the nature thereof, issued in the course of its business and to bind the Company thereby, in an
Amount not to exceed $
*"'* 3,000,000.00 ***
. This Power of Attorney shall expire without further action on June
29,2009,
This Power of Attorney is granted and is signed and sealed by facsimile under and by the authority of the following Resolution adopted by
the Board of Directors of AMERlCAN CONTRACTORS INDEMNITY COl'vlP ANY at a meeting duly called and held on the 6th day of
December, 1990.
"RESOLVED that the Chief Executive Officer. President or any Vice President. Executive Vice President. Secretary or Assistant Secreta/Y, shall have the
power and authority

1.

To appoint Atlorney(s)-in-Faci and to authorize them to execute on behalf oj the Company. and attach the seal oj the Company thereto,
bonds and undertakings, contracts of indemnity and other writings obligatory in the nature thereof and,

2.

To remove. at any time. any such Attorney-in-Fact and revoke the authority given.

RESOLVED FURTHER. that the signatures of such officers and the seal oj the Company may be affixed to any such Power of Attorney or certificate
relating thereto by facsimile, and any such Power oj Attorney or certificate bearing such jacsimile signatures or facsimile seal shall be valid and binding
upon the Company and any such power so executed and certified by jacsimile signatures andfacsimile seal shall be valid and binding upon the Company
in the future with respect 10 any bond or undertaking to which it is attached"

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, American Contractors Indemnity Company has caused its seal to be affixed hereto and executed by its
Executive Vice President on the 9th day of January, 2007.

AMERICAN CONTRACTORS INDEMNITY COMPANY

~.

STATE OF CALlFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

§

By: __~~~~~~~~~~~~~___
Adam S. Pessin, Executive Vice President

";'

§§

.- .

(,)

Signature of Notary
My Commission expires June 29, 2009

1..... n

Camm. No. 1593578

~

NOTARY PUBUC· CALIFORNIA

?

lOSANGELE$COUNT't

-

.... y': ~O;!~E:./~r:;~9~2~~.

t

I, Jeannie J. Kim, Corporate Secretary of American Contractors Indemnity Company, do hereby certify that the Power of Attorney and the
resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of said Company as set forth above, are true and correct transcripts thereof and that neither
the said Power of Attorney nor the resolution have been revoked and they are now in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 11TH

Bond No.
Agency No.

1000795454

day of MARCH

,200 8 .

Z~u~,~

Jeann J. Kim, Corporate ecretary

9012

o
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Rev. POAO,!22106

TUE/FEB/03/2009 05:42 PM
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Barry McHugh, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
Darrin L. Murphey/ Civll Deputy
451 N. Government Way
p,O, Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, 1083816-9000
Telephone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621
ISS #6221

200Q FEB -3 PM 4: 33
CLERK D1STRlCT COURT

Attorney for Defendants Kooienai County, and Rocky
Watson, Kootenai Counly Sheriff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC., an Idaho

Corporation,

Case No. CV-07-7471

Plaintiff,
VS.

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, ROCKY
WATSON, Kootenai County Sheriff, John and

MEMORANDUMfNSUPPORT
OF RENEWED MOTION TO
DISMISS

Jane Does 1 through 13,
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants Kootenai County, and Rocky Watson, Kootenai

County Sheriff, by and through their attorney of record, Darrin L Murphey, ·Civil
Deputy of the Office of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, and submit the

following Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED

MOTION TO DISMISS; 1
H,\Sheriffs

Departmcnt\~~lied ~ail

Bonds 2007\Memo ISO Renewed MOt to pismies.doc.

o

006

TUE/FEB/03/2009 05:42 PM

I.

HR Legal

FAX NQ.

208-446-

9

P. 007

BACKGROUND
The Court in its Order Granting Motion to Dismiss in Part and Denying

Motion to Dismiss in Part, entered on December 12, 2008 (,'Order"), dismissed all
claims against Sheriff Rocky Watson, a/l tort claims, all public records claims, all
claims challenging the acceptance of a credit card to post bail, and all claims
challenging Kootenai County's operation of the Adult Misdemeanor Probation
Department and Pre-trial SeNices Program as without statutory authority and in
violation of Article 10, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution. The only remaining claim is

a breach

of contract claim against Kootenai County arising out of the 2001

Release and Settlement Agreement. Allied alleges "Defendant has breached the
Agreement by" soliciting or encouraging inmates to file cash, credit card, or
"other sources"

of bonds, refuSing to make change for the $10 fee, refusing to

collect the $10 fee from an inmate's account, and not allowing arrestees access

to the phone to cal! a bonding company. (Second Amended Complaint, 118).
Kootenai County seeks dismissal of this remaining claim pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6),

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court set forth the following standard of review in its Order, which is

applicable here.
The standard for reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as the standard for reviewing a grant of
summary judgment. See Idaho Schools For Equal Education v. Evans, 123 Idaho
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWEO
MOTION TO DISMISS: 2
H,\Shariffs Department\Allied Ba~l Bonds 2007\Memo ISO Renewed

MO~

to

D~smias.doc

o
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HR Legal

FAX No, 208-446- OS

p, 008

573,578,850 P.2d 724,728 (1993); Rim View Trout Co. v. Dept of Water
Resources., 119 Idaho 676, 677, 809 P.2d 1155, 1156 (1991). The grant of a
12(b)(6) motion wiH be affirmed where there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the case can be decided as a matter of law. See Moss v. Mid-American
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 302, 647 P.2d 754, 758 (1982);
Eliopulos v. Id~ho State Bankl 129 Idaho 104, 107-08,922 P.2d 401,404-05
(Ct.App.1996). When reviewing an order of the district court dismissing a case
pursuant to I.R.C.P, 12(b)(6), the non-moving party is entitled to have all
inferences from the record and pleadings viewed In its favor, and only then may
the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated. See Idaho
,§Qhools for Equal Education, 123 Idaho 573, 578, 850 P .2d 724, 729; Miles v.
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). ''The Issue is
not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party 'is entitled
offer evidence to support the claims.'
960, 962, 895 P.2d

II

to

Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho

591. 563 (1995) (quoting Greenfield v, .§uzuki Motor Co. Ltd.,

776 F.Supp, 698, 701 (E.D.N.Y ..1991»),

Ill.

ARGUMENT

A.

The Release and Settlement Agreement is Void and
Unenforceable as Against Public Policy.

Former Kootenai County Commissioner Rankin signed the April 19,2001
Release and Settlement Agreement (Exhibit A to Second Amend Complaint), to
resolve the then pending litigation (Case No. CV-OO-5841) between Allied and

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION TO DISMISS: 3
H: \8heriffs

ne~rtment\AJ.1.ie.d

Bail BondI> 2007\Menlo ISO Renewed Not to Dismiss, doc

o
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1

Kootenai County, pursuant to the Board's authority. Idaho Code § 31-813.
The Release and Settlement Agreement was not judicially entered or otherwise
approved by the court, but merely a private agreement between the parties. The
terms of the Release and Settlement Agreement stipulate to certain policies and

procedures at the jail.
In the present case, the court dismissed Sheriff Watson as a party, Allied
now seeks to enforce the Release and Settlement Agreement against the only
remaining defendant, Kootenai County, Allied, however, is now seeking to

enforce the Release and Settlement Agreement in a manner which would violate
public policy,
Whether a contract violates public policy Is a question of law for the court

to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case, Bakker v,
Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLQ, 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P,3d 332, 336 (2005).
"Public policy may be found and set forth in the statutes, judicial decisions or the
constitution," Jd. "All contracts the purpose of which is to create a situation which
tends to operate to the detriment of the public interest are against publlc policy

and void, , ," Barton v, State, 104 Idaho 338,341,659 P.2d 92, 95 (1983),

quoting Western Cab Co. v, Kellar, 523 P,2d 842, 845 (Nev, 1974), 'Tnhe rule in
construing contracts in which the government is a party is to resolve all
ambiguities, presumptions, and implications in its favor," 17A Am,Jur.2d.
Contracts, § 397 (2008),

The Sheriff was not a party to the lawsuit, but executed the Release and
Settlement Agreement.
1

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION TO DISMISS: 4
H.\Sneriffs Dcpartment\Allied Bail ~onda 2007\Memo ISO

~enewed

Mot to Dismiss,doc

o
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Lack of Time Limitation.

The Release and Settlement Agreement does not contain a time limitation
and is therefore void, A contract with a municipality without a time limitation is
void as against public policy. See Dorchester Manor v, Borough of New Milford,
287 N,J.Super. 163, 169,670 A.2d 600,603 (N,J.Super, 1994)(agreement
between municipality and owner of apartment complex could not bind
municipality perpetually in absence of express statutory authority, and was thus

ultra vires and void); 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 452 (1998), "It is
questionable as to whether a definite promise to do, or not to do, an act or a
series of acts in perpetuity is legally enforceable as such a promise may be
contrary to public policy." Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Jdaho 770, 775, 554 P,2d 948, 953
(1976), citing Corbin on Contracts, § 552 (1960). In Barton v, StEre, 104 Idaho at
341, 659 P ,2d at 95, the Court opined: "The State's power to change its road
systems to meet the public's health, safety and welfare needs cannot be
circumscribed by a contract In perpetuity, as such would be void as against
public policy." More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that in the
context of a contract precluding competition for b\.lsiness, the contract is void and
unenforceable if it does not contain a limitation as to time. Jorgensen v.

Coppec!.9&., _ Idaho_, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (March 27, 2008).
Here, Allied seeks to enforce the Release and Settlement Agreement as a
"definite promise to do, or not to do, an act or a series of acts" on the part of
Sherlff Watson, and is seeking an order without duration, "requiring the Sheriff's
Department to abide by its terms." {Second Amended Complaint, p, 3,119, p. 6,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION TO DISMISS: 5
H,\Sherlffa oapartmenC\Alliad

~ail Bon~S

2007\Memo

t~O Renswc~

Mot to Dismiss,doc

o
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1/2). A contract between the County and Allied for an indefinite period or
perpetuity is unenforceable. As such, the relief Allied seeks is against public
policy. Therefore, the Agreement is void and unenforceable.
2.

Attempts to Limit the Power of Successor Boards.

Similarly, the Release and Settlement Agreement, in the manner Allied is
seeking to enforce, Is void as an attempt by a prior board to bind future boards of
the county commission. "Neither county commissioners nor county council have

the power to limit the discretionary functions of their successors." AllEZJl County
Council v. Stellhorn, 729 N.E.2d 608,612 (lnd.App. 2000)(lawsuit settlement
agreement and court order agreed to by county commissioners which limited
discretionary powers, held unenforceable against successor board); Lobolito, Inc.
v. North P9cono School Dist., 722 A.2d 249 (Pa.Commw,Ct. 1998),

Here, as discussed above, the purpose of the signature to the Rerease
and Settlement Agreement by former Commissioner Rankin was to resolve the
prior litigation pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-813, and not some attempt to afford
the county commissioners with authority to direct, supervise or perform the

statutory duties of the elected Sheriff. Even assuming Allied's argument that
Idaho Code § 31-802 somehow provided Commissioner Rankin and the 2001
Board of County Commissioners with the authority to direct or supervise the
Sheriff and his staff and set the policies and procedures at the jair though the
Release and Settlement Agreement, the 2001 Board could not limit any such
discretionary power of a successor Board, As such, even assuming
Allied's argument that the Board has the power to set policies and procedures at
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Of RENEWED
,
MOTION TO DISMISS: 6
a,\sherifEs Depar,roent\Allied Bail BQnd$ 2oo7\Memo rso Ranawad Mot to Dismiss.doc

o
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the jail and direct the Sheriff and his staff, and did so in 2001 through the
Release and Settlement Agreement, the Agreement is

s. limitation on each

successor Board's discretionary power, and is therefore void and unenforceable.

3.

Impedes Public Service and the Rights of Individuals,

Allied alleges that defendants actions are unlavvful because it gives
preferential treatment to credit card companies to the detriment of Allied. To
follow Allied's reasoning, a court would have to find as unlawful, a decision by a
municipality to instaH a public water system because it diverts business away
from the water well drillihg industry, Construing the Settlement Agreement in that
manner would violate publlc policy. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 219 ("contracts
which tend to injure the public service of the government or of an executive,
administrative, legislative, or judicial officer are against public policy and void./f); §
229 ("Agreements calculated to impede the regular administration of justice are
void as against public policy and are not entitled to recognition in any of the
courts of the country.").
Furthermore, Allied is attempting to enforce the Settlement Agreement in a
manner that adversely affects the rights of pretrial detainees, which is in violation
of public policy. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 269 ("The courts are reluct(:lnt to
enforce the exercise of fteedom of contract when it tends to result in injury to
persons beyond the immediate parties to the contract, and an agreement may be
contrary to public policy and illegal because it adversely affects or tends to affect,
a duty which one person owes to another."). Clearly, pretrial detainees have a
right to pre-conviction bail guaranteed by both the Eighth Amendment to the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Of RENEWED
MOTION TO DISMISS: 7
H:\Shsri££a Department\Allied Bail

BQn~s

20Q7\Memo JSO Renewed Mot to

Dismi~s.doc

o
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United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. As
such, AHied is attempting to enforce 1he Settlement Agreement in a manner that
adversely affects an inmate's right to bail, and an inmate's ability to utilize the
pretrial services program. Additionally, Allied is attempting to enforce the
Settlement Agreement in violation of the statutory right to the payment of cash

bail pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3221. "No contract rights ",fe created by
agreements in contravention of state statutes, or federal statutes or regulations."
17A C.J.S. Contracts § 20B. As such, the Release and Settlement Agreement, in
the manner Aflied is attempting to enforce, is void and unenforceable.

B.

AJlied1s Does not Seek Relief Against Kootenai County.

As discussed above, all claims against Sheriff Watson have been
dismissed, leaving only a contract claim against defendant Kootenai County.
However, paragraph 9 of Allied's Second Amended Complaint seeks damages

"as well as an Order requiring the Sheriff's Department to abide by rts terms," As
discussed below, such an order would be a delegation of the powers and duties
of the Sheriff as set forth (n the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code. Even
assuming that Idaho Code § 31-802 was construed to provide the Board of
County Commissioners with the authority to direct or supervise the Sheriff and
his staff, the fact remains that the members of the commission have not been
named In this lawsuit. As such, Allied's complaint for injunctive relief fails to state

a claim.
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The Board of County Commissioners do not Have Authority to
Perform or Direct the Statutory Duties of the Sheriff_

The Board of COUMty Commissioners do not have the authority to perform
or direct the duties of the Sheriff, including operation of the jail. Allied argues that
2

Idaho Code § 31 802 provides the Commissioners with the authority to direct
M

another constitutional officer, the Sheriff, in his management and operation of the

jaiL Under Article XVIII, § 6, Idaho Constitution, ''The board of commissioners
has no authority to pass upon the malfeasance, or misfeasance of any officer.

The statute is plain and unequivocal upon that question .. ," Gorman v, Board of
Commissioners, 1, Idaho 553 (1874). 'The legislature cannot take from a
constitutional officer a portion of the characteristic duties belonging to the office,
and devolve them upon an office of its own creation./I Meller v. Board· of Logan
QQunty Comi§, 4 Idaho 44, 35 P. 712,715 (1894)(citation omitted), quoted with
approval in Givens v. Carlson, 29 Idaho 133, 157 P. 1120, 1122 (1916); and
Wrightv. Callahan, 61 Idaho 167. 99 P,2d 961. 966 (1940). "And If this cannot be
done by the legislature, will it be seriously contended that it can be done by a
board of county commissioners?" Id. "Under our state constitution (which

provides for the election of sheriffs by the electors of the county), the legislature
cannot transfer to other officers, elected by the board of supervisors, important
I

powers and functions which from time Immemorial have belonged to the office of
sheriff." Wright. 99 P.2d at 965 (quoting Wisconsin law)(quotations and citations

Of note, Idaho Code § 67 802(1) similarly provides that the Governor has the
power to supervise the conduct of state executive officers, which includes the
attorney general, secretary of state, state treasurer. etc. Idaho Code § 67-801.
2

M

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION TO DISMISS: 9
H,\Shcri~EB Dapart~ent\Allied

Sail Bonda 2007\Mamo ISO

Renaw~d

Mot to Pismiss.doc

o 014

TUE/FEB/03/2009 05:43 PM

BOCC HR Legal

P. 0[5

omitted).
Going back to Idaho territorial case law, no case has construed Idaho
Code § 31~802 to allow the Commissioners to perform or direct the manner in

which another elected county officer performs his duties. In Clark v. Ada County
Bd. of Com'rs, 98 Idaho 749, 757,572 P,2d 501,509 (1977), Justices Lodge and
Scoggins briefly addressed application of Idaho Code § 31-802 in their
concurring opinion:
Another important point of contention in this case is
presented by petitioners' argument that Blomquist
forbids the Board of County Commissioners to
interfere with the Assessor's functions by establishing
the independent datI? processing audit office and by
transferring to that office fund$ which are budgeted to
the Assessor. Respondents argue the propriety of the
Board's actions on the basis of l.e. § 31-802, which
provides county commissioners with the power to
. "supervise the official conduct of all county officers ...
charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping,
management or disbursement of the public moneys
and revenues" and to "see that they faithfully perform
their duties" ... "
Again, f cannot.agree with respondents' position. I
agree that Section 31-802 may permit the Board to
set up an audit division as part of its own
administrative staff, but Qnly with funds budgeted to
the commissioners for their staff. Creation of a new
county office, and diversion to it of funds budgeted to
the assessor would appear to violate Article 18,
Section 6 of the Constitution, which prohibits the
establishment of any county offices other than those
named in the Constitution, and "this court's decision in
Meller v. Board of Commissioners, 4 Idaho 44, 35 P.
712 (1894), which held that the commissioners lack
the authority to establish a new office unknown to the
Constitution and endow !t with functions already
affixed by law to another office.
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it is clear that the Board of County

Commissioners cannot usurp the statutory duties and powers of the Sheriff.
Other jurisdictions have held that similar statutory language is limited.
However, supervisory power over county officials is
possessed by county boards only when given by
statute, and then only to the extent fixed by statute. A
county board may not usurp the power of any county
officer specificafly imposed by law, or repudiate the
acts of such official within the SCORe of his or her
authority. It does nat have the power to perform the
county officer's statutory duties for them or to direct
the manner in which the duties are performed. In this
regard, a county board has no authority with an
elected official's hiring decision.

20 C.J.S. Counties, § 119 (2008)(emphasis added).
Here, as disoussed above, the purpose of the signature to the Release
and Settlement Agreement by former commissioner Rankin was to resolve the
prior litigation pursuant to ldaho Code § 31-813, and not some attempt to afford
the county commissioners with authority to set policies and procedures at the jail
and direct, supervise or perform the statutory duties of the elected sheriff. Idaho
Code §

31~2202(6)

mandates the Sheriff, and not the County Commissioners:

3 Allied argues that Hansen v. White, 114 Idaho 907, 762 P.2d 820 (1988),
supports Allied's conclusion that the Board of County Commissioners can
supervise the official conduct of the Sheriff. Allied's conclusion is misplaced.
Hansen does not mention or address the application of Idaho Code § 31 ~802 and
merely held that the County has authority to implement a county wide merit
system. Hansen does not afford the Board with the authority to supervise, direct,
or control the conduct oUhe Sheriff or his staff. No such authority exists. In fact,
the Supreme Court has opined that a Board of County Commissioners cannot
review the personnel decision of the Sheriff. "Gibson has failed to identify any
statute that provides a'uthority allowing the Board to review the personnel
decision of an elected County officer." Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746,
757,133 P.3d 1211, 1222 (2006).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION TO DISMISS: 11
H:\Sherifts

Department\A~lied

Bail BondS 20C7\Memo t80 Renewee

MO~

to Dismiss.doc

o

0.16

TUE/FEB/03/2009 05:43 PM

Boce HR

Legal

p, 017

''Take charge of and keep the county jail and the prisoners therein." Similarly,
Idaho Code § 20·601 provides: 'The common jails in the several counties of this
state are kept by the Sheriffs of the counties in which they are respectively
situated ... " The powers of the Board of County Commissioners are generally
limited to management of county property and the county budget. See Title 31,
Chapter 8, Idaho Code.
Idaho Code § 31-802 did not somehow provide commissioner Rankin and

the 2001 Board of County Commissioners with the authority to direct or supervise
the Sheriff and his staff and set the policies and procedures at the jail though the
Release and Settlement Agreement. Only the elected Sheriff has such authority,
Idaho Code §§ 31-2202(6) and 20-601. Likewise, the current Board of County
Commissioners does not have the power to set the policies and procedures at
the jail nor direct or supervise the Sheriff and his staff in the operation ofthe jail.
fd. As such, Allied's allegation that the Board of County Commissioners has the

authority to set policies and procedures at the jail and direct the elected Sheriff
and hls staff in the operation of the jail, fails to state a claim.

D.

Kootenai County is not Directly liable for any Nonperformance
of the Sheriff.

Even assuming, without conceding, any liability on the

pan of the Sheriff, .

does not result in direct liability on the pan of Kootenai County, Idaho Code §
31-2015 requires the Sheriff to maintain an officlal bond, which is maintained
through an insurance pOlicy with the insurer for the County; ICRMP. Idaho Code

§ 2010 places liability on the bond (and therefore ICRMP):
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Whenever, except in criminal prosecutions, any
special penalty, forfeiture or liability is imposed on any
officer for nonperformance or malperformance of
official duty, the Jiabifitv therefor attaches to the offfcial
bond of such officer and to the principal and sureties
thereon,

Idaho Code § 31-2010 (emphasis added); See a/so, Idaho Code § 31~2018
("Each county shalt indemnify its officials and employees against all losses of
public moneys or property, except those which are the result of negligence, gross
negligence, or intentional conduct by the public official or employee, pursuant to
the authority in the Idaho tort claims act."; Idaho Code § 6-903(b)(1)("A
governms!ltal entity shall provide a defense to its employee, including a defense
and indemnification against any claims brought against the employee, , ,"),
However, Kootenai County is not directly liable for the acts or omissions of
county officials and employees.
Thus, Kootenai County is subject to derivative liability, but not direct
liability, for the nonperformance or rnalperformance of a duty by the Sheriff.
Similar to the context of insurance fiability, a party injured in an automobile
accident may sue the tortfeasor, but cannot bring a direct cause of action against
the tortfeasor's insurer, As such, Allied's direct cause of action against Kootenai
County for the conduct of the Sheriff, fails to state a ciaim,
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CONCLUSION.
Based on the foregoing) Kootenai County requests that the Court enter an

order dismissing Allied)~~eCOnd Amended Complaint.

day of February, 2009.

DATED this"3

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
By

CVG--..-,"7Darrin L. Murphey. Civil Deputy
Attorney for Defendants Kootenai
County. and Rocky Watson, Kootenai
County Sheriff

CERllFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

~day of February, 2009, I caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method Indicated below,

and address.ed to the following:

[ J
[

]

[ J

[>(

U,S, Mail
INTEROFFICE DELIVERY
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELEFAX (FAX)

Arthur M. Bistline
Law Office of Arthur M. Bistline
5421 N. Government Way, Suite 101B
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83815

Fax: (208) 665-7290

BY~~
Darrin L. Murphey
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STATE OF. IDAHO

} SS
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ARTHUR M. BISTI.INB
LAW OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
5431 N. Government Way. Suite 1018
Coeurd'AJene. ID 83815
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(208) 665-7270
(208) 665·7290 (fax)

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

ISB: 5216
Attorney for Plaintiff
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFTIIE STATE OF
IDAHO,1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No.: No. CV..07·7471

ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC., an Idaho

Cruporation,

SPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED
OnON TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
VS.

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI. a poHtioal
subdivision of the State ofIdaho; ROCKY
WATSON, Kootenai County Sheriff, John and
Jane Does 1 through 13.
Defendant

COMES NOW, the above named Plaintiff. by and through its Attorney of Record.
ARTHUR M. BIS1LINE~ hereby submits this ReSPODSe to Defendants' Renewed Motion to

Dismiss as follows:
A. This issue is not the proper subject of a motion to dismiss.
The entire premise of the County's motion to dismiss is that the settlement agreement

here is not valid because it violates public policy. This is an argument that can. as a matter of
law, only he made in a SU1llll1W'Y judgment Illotion as it necessarily involves consideratiQn of

issues outside the pleadings. Furthermore, no argument whatsoever is adva.oced as to wby this
agreement is against public peliey. That is because it is not against public policy.
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When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court infers all matters in favor of the nonmoving party which can be reasonably inferred from the complaint. Gibson v. Bennett 141 Idaho
270, 273, 108 P.3d 417, 420 (Ct. App.200S). If considering anything outside the pleadings, the
Court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment and afford the parties the opportunity
to present material relevant to the summary judgment. Jd.
Whether or not a contract violates public policy is a question of law that is to be
determined from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-

Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 (2005). In order to make the
determination that the contract violates public policy, this Court is required to consider matters
outside the pleadings by considering the facts and circumstances of the case.
This motion should be dismissed and the matter properly addressed on summary judgment.

B. The County has cited no authority for the proposition that the Settlement agreement is
void because it does not contain a time limitation
The County cites no Idaho authority for the proposition that a contract with a state agency
that does not contain a time limitation violates public policy as a matter of law. In fact, Barton v.

State, 104 Idaho 338 (1983), cited by the County, establishes the exact opposite conclusion.
Barton holds that contracts \vithout a time limitation may be invalid, based on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
The contract here is not against public policy and the County has made no attempt to
show that it is. A party claiming a contract violates public policy has the burden to show that
fact. "Public policy may be found and set forth in the constitution or in the statutes, or where it
is found in neither it is sometimes set forth by judicial decision." Stearns v. Williams 72 Idaho
276,287,240 P.2d 833,840 (1952) citing Brooks v. Cooper, 50 N.J.Eq. 761, 26 A. 978,21
L.R.A. 617, 35 Am.St.Rep. 793. The County has cited no authority whatsoever to support the
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED
MOTION TO DISMISS
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allegation that the settlement agreement is void as against public policy. The County has not
explained how, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the settlement agreement is
against public policy.
The settlement agreement only requires the COlUlty and Sheriff to treat Allied Bail Bonds,
and other bond agents, in a fair manner. It is not against public policy to require the County and
Sheriff to do what they ought to be doing anyway. No argument is being advanced as to how
this contract violates public policy, the lack of any time limitation is not relevant and the motion
to dismiss should be denied.

C. The fact that the settlement agreement may limit successor boards conduct does not
invalidate the settlement agreement. That detennination involved consideration of
the facts and circumstances of each case,
All the cases cited by the County in SUppOlt of this argument establish that there is no per
se illegality of a contract which limits the conduct of future boards. It is a case by case analysis.

Allen County Council v, Stellhorn, 729 N.E.2d 608,612 (Il1d.App.,2000) specifically
holds that a County can bind future boards to a settlement agreement based on existing law, but
carmot stop them from exercising discretionary functions which may later be granted to the
County by the legislature.

LobolilO, Inc. v. North Pocono School Dist., 722 A.2d 249, 251 -252 (Pa.Cmwlth.,1998)
holds that a board carmot bind a future board and stop it from exercising its governmental
functions. That case seems to also say that a board cannot execute a binding contract that
extends beyond the composition of that board. That may be the law of the state of Pennsylvania,
but it is not the law of the State ofIdaho. Idaho Code 31-601 provides that a county is a body
corporate. Idaho Code 31·602 provides that the County may only act through its board of
commissioners. Idaho Code 31-604 specifically provides what the County may do (as opposed
to the County Commissioners) and one of those things is enter into contracts. There is simply
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED
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no authority to support the proposition that a contract entered into by one board of county
commissioners can be avoided by the next; just as there is no authority for that proposition in the
law of private corporations.
Furthennore, Lobolito is referring to "governmental functions." To rely on that case here
presumes that the functions which the County wishes to perform and eannot (which are as of yet
unidentified) are governmental functions. If they were, then there would have been no need for

the County to enter into this settlement agreement.
The facts and circumstances of how this agreement impacts the discretion of the board of
County Commissioners is the proper subject of a summary judgment. How the agreement
impermissibly impinges on future boards' discretion is not set forth. What discretion the board
wishes to exercise and cannot is not set forth. The motion to dismiss on these grounds should be
denied.

D. The County has advanced no argument to support its contention that the Settlement
agreement adversely affects the rights of pre trial detainees and it in fact seems to
protect them.
The County has provided no explanation as to how the settlement agreement adversely
impacts the rights of pretrial detainees and the motion should be denied on those grounds.
Furthennore, the settlement agreement seems to protect the rights of detainees.
Paragraph 1., provides for a certain type of phone book which provides a full spect11lm of
bonding options to the detainee. Paragraph 2., provides that the $10 bonding fee be collected
from the inmates account if available, which helps facilitate the bonding process. Paragraph 3.,
provides that a receipt shall be provided when the $10 bonding fee is paid, which is required by
Idaho Code 31-3218. Paragraph 4., provides that the Sheriffshall make change for up to a $50
bill when paying the $10 bonding fee, and Paragraph 5., provides for contact between Allied and

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED

MOTION TO DISMISS

-4-

o

023

its customers, both facilitating the bonding process. Paragraph 6., requires the Sheriff to only
point to a plaque that explains bonding options rather than providing oral advice to any
individual. Lastly, Paragraph 7., requires that the Sheriff and County take reasonable steps to
remove blocks which prevent an inmate from calling Allied. How any ofthesc could adversely
impact the rights of pre-trial detainees has not been argued and there is no argument that can be
made in that regard. This Court has already ruled that the law of non-competition agreements is
not relevant. The motion to dismiss should be denied on these grounds.

E. The Board of County Commissioners does have authority over the Sheriff and can
direct his activities.
The Board is given broad authority over the sheriffs department through Article 18,
Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. This authority is expounded upon in Idaho Code 31-802,
which specifies that the BOCC shall supervise "the official conduct of all county officers" and
shall "direct prosecution of delinquencies." The sheriff is defined as a county officer under
Idaho Code 31·2001 (1). Thus, the conduct of the sheriff is subject to the supervision of the
Board.
Case law has language supporting this conclusion. In Hansen v. White] 14 Idaho 907,
907 (1988), the court held that the BOCC had the authority to implement a merit system limiting
the circumstances in which county officers may tenninate its employees. Article 18, Section Six
clearly places the Sheriff in charge of who is hired. Notwithstanding this fact, the BOeC has the
authority to control how the Sheriff fires his employees. If Sheriff Watson was arbitrarily
depriving deputies of their property right in continued employment, and the BOeC did not like

it, the BOCe could stop it. Here, the Sheriff is engaging in a course of conduct which denies
bond agents their property right and certainly the Boec can stop it. If the BOCC chooses not to,

it is not doing its job and can be held directly accountable for that.
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Gorman is not on point. In Gorman, an elected tax collector presented a bond as required
for his elected office. 1 Idaho 553, 553 (1874). The bond was denied on the basis of insufficiency
and testimony '''that he was drunk when he signed the bond, and that he would not be worth a
dollar iIhis debts were paid. '" Id. Shortly thereafter, the board removed the tax collector from

office without a hearing and appointed another in his place. !d. The court held that the denial and
termination were invalid because a statute in place detemlined the amount of the bond, and
expressly limited the board to exigent circumstances. Id. In addition, it stated that "[t]he board of
commissioners has no authority to pass upon the malfeasance, or misfeasance of any officer ...
without hearing the officer or even giving him an opportunity to be heard." Jd.
In Gorman, the context was where the board, ",ithout a hearing or explanation, denied an
elected official a right. This case is about whether the county is responsible for the sheriffs
actions where it does act in an unacceptable manner and the County does nothing to stop it.
AG 86-10 is weakened by Hansen, thus placing the accuracy ofthe AG opinion into question. In

that case, the court held that the Merit System implemented by the Board was a valid limitation
on the sheriff's constitutional right to hire as granted in Article 18, Section 6.114 Idaho at 907.

Hansen stated that although the authority to hire is generally associated with the equal authority
to fire, it is a common law right that may be "restricted by law". 114 Idaho 907 at 915, fn 1L
The Merit System, which disallows the sherifffrom discharging certain employees with showing
just cause, does just that.
However, the AG opinion found that while a Board-mandated personnel system may be

enacted to keep track of the number and type of employees, one allowing "the commissioners to

control the discipline, suspension, or firing for cause of deputies and assistants of other officers
would almost certainly be forbidden" 86-10, p.3. Because Hansen expressly held otherwise, it is
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED
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unlikely that the AG Opinion can even be considered persuasive authority. Obviously, a conflict
exists between the AG Opinion and Hansen.
The BOCC is supposed to be taking the action that Allied Bail Bonds is taking right now
and arc not. If the Sheriff will not listen to the BOCC, then the Sheriff will be subject to an
injunction filed by the prosecutor, whose duty it is to prosecute actions on behalf of the BOCC.

Idaho Code 31-2604. The Sheriff is not free to ignore the direction of the BOCC and the BOCC

is not free to simply allow the Sheriff to engage in lawless activity.
F. Kootenai County is liable for the Sheriffs actions and the fact that a bond mav be in
place and the County has to indemnify the Sheriff is not relevant.
Plaintiff is not allowed to sue the bond directly as pointed out by the County and there is
no authority for the proposition that Plaintiff is required to sue the Sheriff directly because of this
bond. Furthennore, the suit against the County is for failing to control the conduct of the Sheriff
which they clearly can do and are not doing. The County has direct liability for failing to
discharge its duty to monitor the activities of the Sheriff and direct the Kootenai County
prosecutor to take action when necessary.
CONCLusrON
The motion before the Court is proper as a summary judgment motion not a motion to
dismiss and this Court should deny the motion on those grounds. If the Court does consider the
motion, the County has advanced no argument or authority as to how this settlement agreement
violates public policy. The settlement agreement does not and this motion should be denied.

DATED this.lL. day of February, 2009.

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
ATIORNEY AT LAW
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I hereby certify that on the
y of February, 2009, J caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

[J

Darrin Murphy
Kootenai County Department of Legal
Services
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

[ J
[ ]

[]
,t::J

([ J

Hand-delivered
Regular mail
Certified mail
Overnight mail
Facsimile
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//
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LAW OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
5431 N. Government Way. Suite 10lB
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(208) 665-7290 (fmc)
ISB: 5216
Attorney for Plai.tltiff

IN TIm DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFTHE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
No. CV·07.7411 .

Plaintilf.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
UPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER

n.
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, a political
5ubdivisionoftbe State ofIdaho, ROCKY
WATSONt Kootenai County Sheriff, John and
Iane Doe:. I through 13,
Defendant

ARGUMENT

1.

No case has held, and the statute does not expressly Sf!Ya !hat the bond must be
filed first or the case must be dis@ued.

To the extent that the Court is ruling that the filing of the bond the day after the complaint
requires dWnissal. that ruling mould be reconsidered andreversed. The statute does not
expressly say that. no Idaho Case has ever said that, the Idaho Suprcxne Court has questioned

.such a lltemJ readin& and such a holding does not further the purposes of the statute.
SUPPLEMHNTALMHMORANDUM IN
SUPPORTOF' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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The provisions of Idaho Code 6-610 which provide for dismissal of an action are Idaho
Code 6-61 O( 5) through (7). In order to seek a dismissal under subsections (5) through (7),
subsection (4) requires the law enforcement to take exception to certain aspects of the bond.
That section provides that a law enforcement officer can except to 1) failure to file a bond, 2) the
sufficiency of the sureties, or 3) to the amount of the bond.

Idaho Code 6-610(4) does not

specifically provide for an exception for the failure to file a bond befors< filing the action.
No case has ever held that failing to file a bond before filing suit was grOUllds for
dismissal. All cases on point, to Plaintiff's knowledge, have held that failing to file a bond at all
is groUllds for dismissal. Monson v. Boyd, 811daho 575,582,348 P.2d 93, 97 (1959), does not
state that failure to file a bond prior to the action is grounds for dismissaL It only says that if a
bond is never filed, the Court is not required to grant the petitioner leave to do so on a motion to
dismiss.

Lastly, plaintiff contends the court should not have summarily
dismissed the action upon defendants' motion, but should have
allowed plaintiff time to file a bond, upon determining the statute
was applicable. This point was settled adversely to plaintiff in Pigg
v. Brockman, supra. where it is made to appear by evidence in
where it is made to appear by evidence in support of a motion to
dismiss, that the action is against peace officers and arises out of or
in the course of the performance of the duty of such officers, ifI.C.
§ 6-610 has not been complied with, the action must be dismissed.

Monson v. Boyd, 81 Idaho 575,
582-583,348 P.2d 93, 97 (1959).
The Sheriff also points to Johnson v. Boundary School Dist. No.1 OJ, 138 Idaho 331,336,
63 PJd 457,462 (2003), for the proposition that failing to file a bond before suit requires
dismissal. The language itself says nothing of dismissing a case for failing to file a bond before
the complaint; it only notes Idaho Code 6·610" ... expressly states that the preparation and filing
of the bond is a prerequisite to suit." Jd. More importantly, that language is dicta, as the
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Supreme Court was only pointing out that the language of Idaho Code 34-2008, the statute at
issuc, was not, as argued by one a/the parties, the same as Idaho Code 6-610.

Idaho Code 6-610 does not provide for a dismissal for failing to file a bond before the
complaint and 110 Idaho case has ever held that. Reaching that conclusion requires the making of
new Jaw by interpreting the statute in that man'1er. Such an interpretation creates an additional
unstated ground for exception to a bond, fulfills no purpose of the statutc, and has already been
called into question by the Idaho Supreme Court.
The only way to interpret Idaho Code 6-610 to require dismissal if the bond was not filed
before the complaint would be by reading the "prerequisite" requirement of subsection (2) with
the language of subection (5), which allows dismissal ifthe Sheriff excepts to the " ... failure to
file a bond under this section .... " The argument would therefore be that you do not "file a bond

under this section" if you do not file it first.
This interpretation ignores the plain language of Idaho Code 6-6l O( 4), which provides for
an exception for failing to file a bond, and does not make any mention of the timing of the bond.
FurtherlIlore, it would add an additional exception to subsection (4) in allowing for exception for
failing to file a bond first, one which is not expressly laid out in the statute. More importantly,
this interpretation has already been called into question by the Idaho Supreme Court.
In Rogers v. State, 98 Idaho 742,572 P.2d 176 (1977), the Plaintiffs claim was
dismissed for completely failing to file a bond. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case as
it was not ripe for appeal, but on remand noted that if the Trial Court chose to reconsider, it
should do so in light of the " .. . sizeablejurisdicrional problem which materializes from a literal

reading of the

r c. s 6-6J0 requirement that the district court set the undertaking prior /0 gaining
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jurisdiction over the case which seemingly occurs only upon the filing of a complaint." Allied

raised this exact point in front of Judge Luster, who infonned Allied of some of the various: "end
arounds" that have been utilized in an attempt to deal with this problem. However, the real way
to deal with it is to interpret the statute to only allow dismissal if the bond is absent, or
inadequate.
The purposes of the statute arc to ensure diligent prosecution and source of funds for an
award of costs. The only concern of Idaho Code 6-610 is that a bond be filed and that it be
backed by sufficient sureties of a sufficient amount. The Sheriff s argument that a bond must be

filed first does nothing to further any of these purposes and the Sheriff has never argued
othenvise. No reasonable person could make any such argument.

Lastly, in this case, just as in Garren v. Butigan,
The plaintiffs complaint presents no hint of the motives or facts
which the statute seeks to prohibit. In light of the prolonged and
dilatory proceedings the plaintiffdeserves an adjudication on the
merits 0/ his case, and we reiterate 'that a motion to dismiss,
presented under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), has generally been viewed with
disfavor because of the probable waste of time in case of a reversal
or a dismissal of the action and because the primary objective of
the law is to obtain a determination of the merits o/the claim.'
95 Idaho 355, 359,509 P.2d 340, 344 (1973)
(emphasis added), citing Hadfield v. State,

86 Idaho 561, 568, 388 P.2d 1018, 1022
(1963); Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho

451,353 P.2d 782 (1960).

Throughout these proceedings, the Sheriff has made it sound as if the black letter law
states that failing to me a bond before the complaint requires dismissaL The statute does not say
this. Barring a tortured interpretation, no Court has ever said this, and the Supreme Court has
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specifically suggested that such a literal reading is problematic. Lastly, no purpose whatsoever is
served by this interpretation. It only increases litigation costs and denies Allied its day in Court.

II.

The Coun!:y- assumed a duty under the contract and is therefore liable for the
Sheriff's breach of that contract.

The County moved to dismiss this case on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted because the County cannot control the action of the Sheriff and is not
directly liable for the actions of the sheritI: The Court granted the motion on those grounds.

The County voluntarily entered into a v"Titten settlement agreement that required certain
conduct on the part of the sheriff. Tfthe County did not wish to assume the responsibility for the
Sheriffs actions, then the County should not have signed that agreement. "A voluntary duty is
distinct from any other duty the party may have as a result of another undertaking or

relationship." Jones v, Rurif/, Leroy, Coffin & Mallhews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 612, 873

P.2d 861, 866 (1994). When parties enter into a contractual relationship, they assume contractual
duties. Badel! v. Badell 122 Idaho 442, 447, 835 P.2d 677, 682 (Ct. App, 1992) The County's
defenses that it has no control over the sheriff is one of impossibility of performance and not the
proper subject of a 12(b)(6) motion.

Futhermore, impossibility requires that something happen that was not in the

contemplation of the parties. Ferguson v, City of Orofino, 131 Idaho 190, 193, 953 P.2d 630,
633 (Ct. App., 1998). None of the relevant County laws have changed since the contract was
signed. Impossibility is therefore nol applicable as a defense because nothing has happcncd to be
outside the contemplation ofthe parties.
Lastly, to suggest that the County cannot control any aspect of the Sheriffs conduct,
other than merit~based raises and tiring issues, is just wrong. Besides Idaho Code 31-802, which
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specifically requires the Commissioners to supervise the Sheriff and direct prosecution for
delinquencies, Idaho Code 20-622 specifically gives the commissioners authority to take action
inside the Sheriffs compotmd by providing for inspections and requires the commissioners to
take all necessary precaution against escape sickness or infection. Additionally, Idaho Code 311503 allows the commissioners to control the Sheriff by controlling the funds paid to the sheriff.
That section provides that commissioners" ... must not allow any account of any County officer
while he neglects or refuses to perform any duty required of him by law or is liable upon any

offiCial bond or other bond." Emphasis added. The County has just successfully argued that the
Sheriff's bond is liable, but then has done nothing to control his lawless actions. The County can
control the Sheriff because the County controls the money and directs the County Attorney. If
the County is not going to control the Sheriff then who is? If the Sheriff begins absconding with
County money, are the tax payers to wait for the next election?

The County voluntarily assumed a duty to see that the terms of this settlement agreement
were followed. The County has control oftlle County Prosecutor as well as the Sherifrs purse
strings. The County can statutorily control the actions of the Sheriff and besides that has
assumed a contractual duty to do so. The County should be reinstated as a party defendant to this
lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the above, the Court should Grant the motion to reconsider.
','

DATED this

"'aay of February, 2009.
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFTHE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

Case No. CV-07-7471
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

vs.

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, ROCKY
WATSON, Kootenai County Sheriff, John and
Jane Does 1 through 13,
Defendant

ARGUMENT
1. The claim for public records must be reinstated because the plaintiff fulfilled the
pleading requirements of Rule" and is entitled to relief under the Public Records
Act.

Rule 8(a)( 1) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief," and must be "construed as to do substantial justice." I.R.C.P.8(t). Whether a
pleading complies with this requirement is "interpreted liberally." Crea v. FMC
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Corporal ion, 135 Idaho J 75, 178, 16 P.3d 272, 275 (Sup. Ct. 2000); see also Whitlock v. Haney
Seed Co., 114 Idaho 628, 759 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1988), Greem·vade v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,
]19 Idaho SO 1, 808 P.2d 420 (Cl. App. 1991). In Whitlock, the plaintiff made claims against his
employer for unpaid vacation and withholding of an insurance policy. 114 Idaho 628, 633 eCI

App. 1988). The court found in the plaintiffs favor as to tbose two items and awarded treble
damages as ordered by statute, although the statute was nol pled by either party. Id The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that since the plaintilT generally pled monetary damages, the court
could award what monetary damages it saw fit: "[Defendant] has not cited any authority
supporting the proposition that statutes automatically enhancing or limiting damage awards must

be specifically pleaded, nor has our research disclosed any authority on this point." Id. at 634.
In addition, the court relied on the fact that the statute in question was of a "mandatory - rather
than discretionary

application," and thus "[i]ts application

to

a fact pattern within its scope is

automatic." fd
Here, Allied Bail Bonds pled in the complaint that public records were improperly

denied, and generally requested "any other relief that this court deems fair and equitable."
(Complaint, finai paragraph). The statute states that if a couli finds improper denial of a public
records request, it shall order the withholding authority to immediately produce those records
requested.

I.e. § 9-344 (2).

Just as in Whitlock, Allied pled factual circumstances and general

relief. Since the statute in question is of a mandatory nature, and there is nothing in i1 that

requires an express and specific request for production of public records, this Court should
reconsider its decision to dismiss Jor failure to state a claim.

2. Because the court, not the defendant, excepted to the sufficiencv of the sureties,
dismissal of the Sheriff on this basis is error.
A plaintiff "shall prepare and file with, and at the time of filing the complaint or rdition in
any such action, a \'YTitten undertaking with at least two (2) sufficient sureties in an amount to be
fixed by the court."

J.e. § 6-610 (2).

However, objection by the defendant must first be had

before the court may dismiss the case. I'igg v. Bruckman, 791da110 233,238,314 P.2d 609, 611

(1957); Beehler v. FremonE County, 145 Idaho 656, 659.182 P.3d 713, 716 (Ct. App. 2008).
Once the defendant objects to the sufficiency of the sureties, "the sureties must be justified by
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the plaintiff or petitioner."

I.e. § 6-610 (6). Only jf the plaintifl fails to justify must the court

then dismiss the case. ld.
Here, Lhcre is no evidence fhat the defendant ever excepted to the sufticiency of the
sureties. Under thc statute, the court is powerless to move sua sponte in exception to the
sufficiency ofthc surety or bond. In addition, the plaintiff was never given an 0pp0l1unity 10
justify the existing sureties, Thus, the dismissal by the court through its own action is
inappropriate and undermines the due process procedures provided by the legislature within the
statute.

3, Plaintiff submitted a bond supported bv "two el} sufficient sureties" as required by
statute.
Prior to £iling suit against any la\v enforcement arising out of lhe officer's performance of

duty, a claimant must first suhmit a bond supported hy two sufficient sureties and approved by
the court. I.e, § 6-610. "Tv'!o sufficient sureties" is not defined anywhere in Idaho. Because
there is no case that discusses what ,,,:ould be sufficient, nor any statutory comment or direction,

it is unclear as to what standard Plaintiff should have abided.
In this case, Plaintiff attempted to follow the statute as closeJy as possible under the

circumstances. He was issued a bond by surety American Contractors Indemnity Company.
American Contractors is one of severa! branches of Bce Surety Group CHCC Surety"), "the 9
largest writer of surety in the United States," (Exhibit A

th

HCC Surety Webpage), HCC Surety

is, in tum, a subsidiary and "backed by the financial stability of [its] parent company, HCC
Insurance Holdings, Inc." ("HCC Insurance") (See Exhibit A), Since American Contractors is
backed by both HCe Surety and its branches along with HCC Insurance, it appears that there
were mUltiple sureties and that they would be more than sufficient in satisfying the statutory
requirements. The policy of obtaining sueh a bond witb sufficient sureties is to "ensure diligent
prosecution" and provide a dependable source of payment from which an offic.er may recover if

judgment is entered against the petitioner. Ie. 6·610 (2). Here, Plaintiff obtained sufficient
sureties for his bond because there are several branches and backers, and it is highly unlikely that
the Sheriff\vould be unable to recover from the ninth largest writer of sureties in the United
States. Thus, the bond was sufficient under the statute and its policies, and this court should
reimtate the bond as posted,
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4. Because the language of Title X, Section 5 of the Constitution is clear and
unambigutlus, the Court mav not engage in interpreting its plain language.

When interpreting the Constitution, the courts generally follow the standard rules of
interpretation used in interpreting statutory provisions. Sweeney v. Otter, 1 i 9 Idaho 135, 138,

804 P.2d 308,311 (l990). Under the statutory rules ofimerpretation, where the language is clear

and unambiguous, the court must carry out the pJain language and "'expressed intent'" Id.,
quoting Stale Dept.

0/Law Enforcement v. One 1955 IFillys Jeep,

100 Idaho 150, 153, 595 P.2d

299,302 (1979). That is, "where the language is unambiguous, thcre is no occasion for the
application of the rules of interpretation. Id. "The fundamental object in construing
Constitutional provisions is to ascertain the intent of the draf1ers by reading the words as wTit1en,
employing their natural and ordinary meaning, and construing them to fulfill the intent of the
drafters. Jd. at 139, 804 P.2d at 3 i 2. Only where the language is "ambiguous, incomplete,
absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws" may the court engage in judicial construction.
Arel v. T & L Enterprises, Inc., 146 Idaho 29, _, 189 P3d 1 J49, I 152 (2008).

Article 10, Section 5 of the Constitution reads as follows:
State Prisons Control Over. The state legislature shall establish a
nonpartisan board to be knovm as thc state board of correction, and
to consist of three members appointed by the governor, one
member for two years, one member for four years, and one
member for six years. After the appointment of the first board the
tenn of each member appointed shall be six years. This board
shall have the control, direction and management o/the

penitentiaries oftlte state, their employees and properties, and of
adult probation and parole, with such compensation, powers, and
duties as may be prescribed by iaw.
emphasis added (last amended 1941). This language is not ambiguous

01'

subject to any other construction other' than the board of correction has
control, direction and management of adults on probation.
Even if this Court docs engage in construction, the conclusion is the
same. At the time of the last amendment ofthe Article 10, Section 5,
probation for misdemeanors as not recognized. See Sess. Laws 1911, c. 15,
§2, p. 33 (misdemeanor punishable only by fine or imprisonment); §73 of the
Public Utilities Act, cited in Neil v Public Utilities Commissioll
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Idaho 44, _.178 P 271, 281 (1919) (Budge, J., dissenting) (misdemeanor
punishable only by nne or imprisonment). By the same token, the legislature

had distinguished between misdemeanors and felonies by the time that
portion ofthe Constitution was last revised. Sec Rev. Code 1887, §§ 6312,
6313. In fact, as of the time of last amendment of Article 10, Section 5,
legislative code existed that authorized county probation officers, but only in
relation and limited to the direction and care of children as juvenile

delinquents. I.e. 31-1215, et seq, 31-1312 (Rev. Code 1932).
The framers of the last amendment to Article 10, Section 5, were aware that crimes could
be divided into misdemeanors and felonies and that control of juveniles on probation had been

iegisiatively delegated to County control. At no point is "felony" or "misdemeanor probation"
mentioned in either the whole of the Constitution, or in Article J 0, Section 5. If such a
distinction - that is, to limit the State Department of Corrections to only control probation for
felonies - was intended hy the framers at the time of drafting and amendment of Aliicle J 0,
Section 5, thcy would have said so, since they were aware (hat probation at a county level could
exist.
The language of Article 10, Section 5, is not subject to interpretation or construction as it
is plain al1d not ambig1..lOuS. Even if this Court docs engage in int(;!rprctalion and construction,

the only conclusion that can be reached is that the framers of Article 10, Section 5, knew that
misdemeanor probation for juveniles had been delegated to the County and they chose not to do
the same for adults on probation. Therefore, the Court should grant this motion to reconsider and
reinstate Plaintiffs claim under Article 10, Section 5, of the Constitution.

CONCLUSIO:\f
Based on the grounds stated above, this COUli should GRANT Plaintiff's motion to
reconsider and RFlNST ATE Plaintiff's claims.

DATED this

J3 day of March, 2009.
-'~~~~--'~---

AR;fHUR M. BISTLINE
ATTOR."iEY FOR PLAINTIFF
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFTHE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
ALLIED BAIL BONDS, .INC., an Idaho
Corporation;

Case No. CV-07-7471

anON TO DISALLOW ITEMS OF COSTS.
Plaintiff,
VS.

COUNTY OF KOOTENAl, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, ROCKY

WATSON, Kootenai County Sheriff, John and
Jane Does 1 through 13,
D~fendant

CO!v1ES NOW, the Plaintiff, ALLIED BAIL BONDS, by and through its atU>rney of
record, ARTHUR M. BISTLINE, and hereby requests that the Court disallow certain items of

costs sought by Defendants in this action.

1.. The Defendants have gresented no reasoned argument as to why any of the cited
statutes allow for an award of attorneys fees and the motion should be4enieg on
those grounds.

When a party makes application for attorney's fees. the party must cite to the statute or
part of the contract that allows the award of fees. "The party must then provide a reasoned

argument, supported by case law as necessary. explaining why that statutory or contractual
provision entitles the party to an award of attorney fees in this instance. For example. if the party

seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12 120(3) on the ground that the case is an
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action to recover in a commercial transaction, the party should, to the extent necessary, provide
facts, authority, and argument supporting the claim that the case involves a 'commercial
transaction' and that such transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit." Bream v. Benscoter, 139
Idaho 364. 369-370, 79 P.3d 723, 728 - 729 (2003). Here, Defendant sets forth a laundry list of
statutes under whicb he might claim fees (See Defendant's MOlion and Affidavit for Attorney's
Fees), but only makes an argument for fees utilizing a clause in the contract. His request on the
grounds of a frivolous lawsuit merely state the claim is frivolous; he cites to no case law and fails
to point out

h01t'

the claims were frivolous other than that Plaintiff was put on notice of it by his

responsive pleadings.
Most importantly, no authority is cited for the proposition that a governmental lawyer is
entitled to hourly rate of a private attorney, or any hourly rate for that matler. 1 It is incumbent on

the County to provide this citation and the failure to do so is fatal to the claim for fees.
Therefore, because there is no reasoned argument supporting Defendant's request for
attorney's fees, the motion should be denied. Furthermore, none oftbe statues apply,
The statutes listed by Defendants in support of his motion for attorney's fees are

inapplicable. Under I.e. §9-344, an award of attorney's fees is given if a claim for public
records is frivolously requested or denied. Here, the request was not frivolous, it was merely
dismissed for failure to make tbe proper requests as required under the statute. Therefore, that
statute is inapplicable. I.e. § 6-610 only allows for an award of attomeys fees" ... as provided by
law," 6-6\ 0(3) and makes no provision for an award offees based on that statute. Athay v.

Stacey 196 P.3d 325, 33 J (2008)

I

The underSIgned does not mean to suggest that Mr. Murphey or any governmental lawyer for that matter is any less

competent than private counsel.
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I.e. §6-918A only allows [ces if the action is brought in bad faith. Similarly ldaho Code

12-121, Idaho Code 12-1 J 7 only allows for fees if there is no reasonable basis in law or Iact for
the claim against the governmental agency. The County signed a contract. That alone is enough
basis to bring suit against the County. There other claim related the operation of Adult
Misdemeanor probation certainly has a basis in law and fact. The Idaho Constitution says that
adults on probation or under the supervision of the department corrections, not the County, This
Court engaged in unnecessary and improper construction to reach a different conclusion.
2. Neither the Countv nor the Sheriff are prevailing parties,
Costs are only allowed to a prevailing party and attorneys fees can only be allowed as a
cost when the same is provided for by statute or contract.
The Sheriff is not a prevailing party. A dismissal based on failure to comply with Idaho
Code 6·610 is not an adjudication oflhe claim on the merits, Athay v. Stacey, 196 P.3d 325,
332 (2008), and there can be no "prevailing party" until there has been an adjudication on the
;neds. Srraubv. Smilh, 145 Idaho 65, 72-73, 175PJd754, 761-762(2007).

The County is not a "prevailing palty" because the claims against the County were
likewise not detclmincd on their merits, but dismissed because the County has no control over
the Sheriff. As set forth below, the County answers for the conduct of its Sheriff under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.

.1 Because Plaintiff's claims cannot all be considered frivolous. fees awarded based on
frivolltv v{ould be improper.

"f AJ court may award attorney fees to a prevailing party where it finds the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. In determining

the prevailing party, the court examines the final result obtained in relation to the reliefsought,
\vhelher there were multiple claims or issues, and the extent to whieh either pariy prevailed on

MonON TO D1SALLOW COSTS

- 3-

o

044

each separate Lssue or claim," First State Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608, 615, 130
PJd 1146, ]153 (2006), citing

I.e § 12-121

and IRCP 54(e)(1),

Here, Plaintiff s claim for breach of contract was valid, It was based on activities taking
place in the jail that had previously been the basis of the settlement agreement, and the sheriff
had agreed to refrain from such activities. The fact that the offensive behavior litigated and
settled before had started up again is a basis for claiming breach of the contract. With regard to

Plaintiffs other claims, there was no law against those claims; to state they were frivolous
merely because no one had madc those challenges before is ludicrous,
In addition, most of the claims were dismissed for procedural technicalities; the claims
the court stated sounded in tort were dismissed for faj lure to file a tort claim prior to
commencing litigation, the claims against the Sheriff were dismissed for failure to file a
sufficient bond, and the claims against the

COWlty

for the behavior at the jail were dismissed

because the coun found that the county was an improper party as it did not have control over the
Sheriff.
Finally, most of the claims \vere dismissed without prejudice, so it is ul1l'easonable for

Defendants to stale that they were the prevailing parties when such claims can be re-filed.
Therefore, this Court should deny Defendant's motion for attorney's fees.

:1.,. A.\?.c.:,QIgiIlliJQJ.h.~..cQgDt'iJJhe County is not a party to the c0n1Jact_u129n which it seeks
an 3Y:-:illJigLllJlorneys fees, but merely a signatory to allow the claims against the
Sheriff to be dismissed. To the extent that the County is a party..to the Settlement
Agreement, then that agreeme:nt is void as it is illusory and unsupported by
.C::Q1J_~.i.~t~I~Hi9n.

At page 11 of the County's renewed motion to dismiss filed Fehmary 3,d, 2009, the
County argued, "Here, as discussed above, the purpose of the signature to the release and
Settlement Agreement by fonner commissioner Rankin was to resolve the prior litigation
pursuant to Idaho Code 31-813, and not some attempt to afford the county commissioners with
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authority to set policies and procedures at the jail and direct, supervise or pCrfOl1D the statutory
duties of the elected sheriff." This Court agreed. If the County Commissioners were not a party
to that contract, and merely acting as the sole entity who could bind the SheriCr, then it is not
entitled to the benefit oftlle contract's terms, palticularly the attorney's fees provision,
Furthermore, if the County couldn't agree to any of those terms because it lacked the
authority to do so, then there is no contract with the County Commissioners as any such contract
lacks consideration. Shore v. Peterson, 2009 WL 540542, 8 (2009).
Lastly, it was error to dismiss the County. The County answers

±<ll' the malfeasance of its

Sheriff under the doctrine of respondeat superior. "Even though Deputy Athay and Sheriff
Stacey were properly dismissed [pursuant to IC 6-61 OOJ as defendants in this action, that

dismissal was not on the merits. Therefore, Bear Lake County could still be liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior." Athay v. Stacey, 196 PJd 325, 332 (2008),
DATED this 3 rd day of April, 2009.

------~~~?-.-:
:-------==----------ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
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I hereby certify that on the ',' day of~~clr,'2009, r caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by thc method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Darrin Murphey
Kootenai County Department of Legal
Services
PO Box 9000
Coeur d' Alene, II) 83816

[1
[ J

r]

[ ]

[>J
[J

Jland-delivered
Regular mail
Certified mail
Overnight mail
Facsimile
Inte.l'Office Mail,
////

____~~___________

BY:~/~'~'

TANICA HESSELGESSER
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(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFTIIE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC., an Idaho

Case No. CV·07·7471

Corporation,
UPPLMENTAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT
Plaintiff,

F MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER

VS.

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, a politiuI
subdivision oithe State ofIdaho. ROCKY
WATSON, Kootenai County Sheriff, John and
Jane Does 1 through 13,

Defendant

ISSUE:

Whether the Idaho Tort Claims Act applies to Allied's cause pf action basedon

Idaho Constitution Article 8. Section 4.

This Court state~ "Even though the allegation in paragraph 8(h) of the Second
Amended Complaint dated October 22nd• 2008, alleges a constitutional violation, (see

School District No.8, Twin Falls Coumy v. Twin FaIls County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 30

Idaho 400, 164 P. 1174 (J 917) for a discussion of Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section

4), as alleged it is a tort. H The Court concludes that be<;ause the effect of the violation of
this constitutional provision is to interfere with Allied's business. it is the tort of

SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER

o O"·

, .fr
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interference with business relations. The nature of the damages does not determine the
nature of the cause of action. While there may be a common law tort for tortiuous
interference with business relationship, that does not change the fact that Allied's claim is
based in the constitution.
In lvfcQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho 719, 727, 747 P.2d 741, 749 (1987), an
inverse condemnation case, the Idaho Supreme Court made clear that while there may be
causes of action that cover the same conduct, that does not change the underlying nature
of the claim. "It is made clear that what would otherwise be a common law or

statutory tort action for destruction or impairment of property or propetiy rights when
the defendant is a state or other govt:rnmental entity, it is an action predicated on the
Constitution itself, i.e., a constitutionally grounded damage action, and not a cause of
action created by the legislature. l13 Idaho 719, 727, 747 P.2d 741, 749 (1987)
The Sheriff and County's conduct is in violation of the Idaho Constitution. The
effect of that is to harm Allied's business and while there may be torts that cover the
same conduct, that does not change the nature of the claim and that claim is based in the
Constitution.

Whether the County can be held res120nsible for the Sheriffs action in respondeat
§.llilerior.
In Athay v. Stacey, 196 P.3d 325 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that
the Sheriffs dismissal for failing to file a bond, and stated, "Even though Deputy Athay

and Sheriff Stacey were properly dismissed as defendants in this action, that dismissal
was not on the merits. Therefore, Bear Lake County could still be liable under the
doctrine of respondent superior."
The COWlty should not have been dismissed from this SUlt.

SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER

2

o

049

th

DATED this 15 day of April, 2009.

/

c:;::-------'----.ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
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I hereby certify that on the ~ day of~ 2009, r caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

[ ]
[]

Darrin Murphy
Kootenai County Department of Legal
Services

SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER

[]

Interoffice Mail

r]
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PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83816

Hand-delivered
Regular mail
Certified mail
Overnight mail
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DARRIN L. MURPHEY
KOOTENAI COUNTY DEPARTMENT

OF LEGAL SERVICES
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451 N. Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone: (208)446-1620
Facsimile: (208) 446·1621
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ISBA# 622!
Attorney for Defendants Kootenai County and
Rocky Watson, Kootenai County Sheriff

IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COli'NTY OF KOOTENAI

ALLIED BAIL BONDS, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Case No. CV 07-7471

PlaintitT,
\
)

vs.

)
)

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, a political subdivision of )
the State of Idaho, ROCKY WATSON, Kootenai
)
County, Sherin: John and Jane Does 1 through 13,
)
)
Defendants.
)

MEMOJ~ANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS AMENDED
COMPLAINT

--------------------------)
I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Allied Bail Bonds, Inc, ("Allied") filed this civil action against
Kootenai County and Sheri ff Rocky Walson arising out of contract, tort and state statute,
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II. BACKGROUND
1.

On or about April 19,2001, the parties entered into a Release and
Settlement Agreement. resolving certain disputes between the parties,
including but not limited to the coilcetion of bonding fees and bonding
information provided to inmates. (Amended Complaint, pg. 2, ~ 7).

2.

Allied submitted to the County a letter dated October 9,2007, and entitled
"Notice of Ton Claim." (Murphey Affidavit dated February 18,2008, Ex.
"B"). The lctter alleges that for an unknown period of time, Kootenai
County has deprived Allied

or its prospective economic opportunity and

breached the settlement agreement, but fails to describe the individuals
involved nor the amount of damages claimed. ld.
3.

On or uboul October 9,2007, the samc datc as Allied's "Notice of Tort

Claim," Allied filed a Complaint seeking damages and iJ~unctive relief for
breach of the Release and Settlement Agreement ancl "other conduct
designed to deprive Plaintiff of its econorn ic opportunity", and damages
arising out of alleged denial of public rc<.:orcis requests submitted by Frank
Davis. (Complaint, pg. 2 - 3, ~ 8, pg. 4, ~12, and pg. 3, ~19).
4.

On October 10, 2007, aftcr Allied filed its Complaint, Allicd nied a bond
in the amount of $700.00, with one surety.

S.

Defendants [jed an Answer and affirmative defenses on February 7, 2008.

6.

On or about February J 9, 2008, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds that the Complaint fails to state a claim and that the courl
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The motion was noticed to be heard on
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March 4,2008, but rescheduled to the court's next earliest date, July 23,
2008, due to a conflict in the schedule of plaintiff's counsel.
7.

On March 24, 2008, after hearing, the court entered its Order Granting
Defendant's Motion Excepting 10 Bond, ordering Allied to tile a bond

with the court no later than five (5) days from the date oflhe order, with at

least two (2) sufficient sureties in an amount not less than $25,000.00.
Allied subsequently filed a power of attorney, which by its terms expires
on June 29,2009.

8.

On or about June 17,2008, the

COUl1

entered an order granting Allied

[cave to file an amended complaint. In addition to the claims in Allied's
original Complaint, Allied's Amended Complaint alleges that the County

breached the Settlement Agreement by "Directly soliciting inmates to file

cash or credit card bonds" and by "[n]ot allowing arrcstces access to the
phone to call a bonding company until after Pre-Trial Services has
conducted interviews with the arrestees", as well as other allegations of

breach of the agreement. (Amended Complaint, pg. 2, ~i 8). Allied also
alleges in its Amended Complaint that accepting credit cards for payment
of bail is not authorized by fdaho Code or Criminal Rule, and that the
County's operation oflhe Adult Misdemeanor Probation Department and
the pre-trial services program is not lawful. (Amended Complaint, pg. J4,r:~lO-15).

III. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
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Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses shall be made by motion: (1) Jack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufticiency of process,
(S) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to stale a
claim upon which r~iieCcan~....K@!1tcd, (7) failure to join
an indispensable party, (8) another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause.
The standard for r..lling on a motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, is familiar.

Our standard for reviewing a Rule J2(b)(6) motion for
dismissal of the complaint is the same as our summary
judgment standard. The nonmoving party is entitled to
have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor and
only then may the question be asked whether a claim for
relic f has been stated.
Miles 'y'-')dabQ..p~)~t;L(:Q:, 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). See also,
Qrthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995); ~".9£hli\.!1~'c.
Beta.Ths:ta 1.lErat~rniJY, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). Aithough
defendants must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, neither defendants nor the court are bound by legal conclusions cast by a
complaint as allegations of fact:
On a motion brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), this
Comi's inquiry is essentially limited to the content oflhe
complaint, although matters of public record, orders, items

appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to
the complaint may also be taken into account. See e.g,
Chester (QlJJ1!YJntermediate Unit Y. PennsylvanlAJ31u(;
Shield, 896 F.2d 808 (3rd Cir. 1990). In evaluating a
motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court mLlst
"consider the pleadings and affidavits in a light most
favorable (0 Plaintiff." Jones v. Cit'cofCarlisk'".KY.,., 3
F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoling W~sh v. Gibbs, 631
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F,2d 436, 439 (6th CiI. 1980), cerl. denied, 450 U.S. 981
(1981 )). However, though construing the complaint in
favor of a non-moving party, a trial court will not accept
conclusions of law or unwarranted inferences cast in the
form of factual allegations. See, e,g, City of Heath, Ohi9.
v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F, Supp. 971,975 (S.D. Ohio
1993). This Court will not dismiss a complaint for failure
to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that
Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
CzUpi~_~?rd

Pak Incorporated, 916 F,Supp. 687,689 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (bare

statement of unlawful racial discrimination is legal conclusion that need not be accepted
as true). "[W]e are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation," Paj2?san v, Allam, 478 U.S. 265, 2g6 (1986) (statement that funding
disparity leads to a minimally adequate education is a legal conclusion, not allegation of
fact), "[Tlhe court is not required to accept legal conciusions cast in the form of factual
allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged."
Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 FJd 752, 754 (9th CiL 1994) (citations omitted).
"However, legal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations are
not given a presumption of truthfulness." 2A Moore's Federal Practice.

! 2.07, at 63 (2d

cd. 1986) (footnote omitted).
Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a Rule 12(b)(I) motion can attack the substance of
a complaint's jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency, and in so doing
rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the comi. "A motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of the complaint or
may be made as a 'speaking motion' a1tacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
in fact." IllOmhill Publish.lOgSg-'..,Y..:.J;:Ieneral Tel. & Elc,LCom, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9

th
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Cir. 1979) (analyzing similar federal rule). The standards applicable to a Rule 12(b)( 1)
speaking motion differ greatly from the standards for ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.
Faced with a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction,
'the tria! court may proceed as it never could under Rule
(N)o presumptive
12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
truthfulness attaches to plaintiffs allegations, and the
existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the
trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of
jurisdictional claims. Moreover, thc plaintiff will have the
burdcn of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.
Id (citations omitted) (analyzing similar federal rule).

Until all statutory administrative remedies are exhausted, the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.
Pursuit of statutory administrative remedies is a condition
precedent to judicial review. fairway Dev. Co. v. BaI1JloC~
County, 119 Idaho 121, 124,804 P.2d 294,297 (J990).
''IT]hc doctrine of exhaustion generally requires that the
ease run the full gamut of administrati ve proceedings
before an application for judicial relief may be considered."
Reg~n v. Kootenai County, 140 ldaho 721, 724, 100 P.3d
615,618 (2004).
Park v. Banbuu, 143 Idaho 576,

,149 P,3d 851, 853 (2006). The court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction on action brought under the Tort Claims Act where the plaintiff fails
to comply with notice requirements. Madse.n....'I:Jdaho Dept. ofHealth

<3.nst Welfare,

116

Idaho 758, 779, 761 P.2d 433, 436 (Ct. App. 1989).
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction on Allied's Tort Claims For
Failure to Comply with the Tort Claims Act.

Allied's Amended Complaint alleges that defendants have deprived Allied of its
economic opportunity or prospective business advantage by accepting credit cards for
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bail and operation of the Adult lv1isdemeanor Probation Department and pre-trial services
program. (Amended Complaint, '1~11 0- j 6). Interference with economic opportunity or
prospective busmess advantage sounds in (ort. See Idaho First NatlBank v. Bliss Valley
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). This court lacks subject matlcr
jurisdiction on Allied's claims based upon Allied's failure to satisfy the notice
requirements set forth in Idaho Code § 6-907.
Until all statutory administrative remedies are exhausted, the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.

Pursuit of statutory administrative remedies is a condition
precedent to judicial review. J~irway.Dev. c:.CLY: Bannock
County, 119ldaho 121, 124,804 P.2d 294, 297 (1990).
"[TJhe doctrine of exhaustion generally requires that the
case run the full gamut of administrative proceedings
before an application for judicial relief may be considered"
Regan v. Kootenai County. 140 Idaho 721, 724, 100 P.3d
615,618 (2004).
Park v. Banbury, 143 Idaho 576, ___ , 149 P.3d 851,853 (2006). The court lacks subject

matter j uriscliction on action brought under the Tort Claims Act where the plaintiff fails
to comply with notice requirements. Madsen v. Idaho Dept. oCH.£.alth and Welfare, 116
Idaho 758, 779, 761 P.2d 433, 436 eCL App. 1989).
It is well settled that compliance with the Tort Claims Act's notice requirement is
a mandatory condition precedent

no matter how legitimate.
Att.'.LQen~,

Ud~.ll

(0

bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim,

v. Idaho State Board of Land Comm'rs Ex Rel Idaho

119 Idaho 1018, 1020, 812 P.2d 325 (el. App. 1991); ;v1cQuillen v.CitY_QJ

Ammo!:, 113 Idaho 719,722,747 P.2d 741 (1987); Jacaway v. State, 97 Idaho 694, 551
P2d J 330 (1976). Once it is determined that the claimant has not filed the prerequisite
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notice, dismissal of thc action by district coun is mandated by the act. Jd.; Idaho Code §
6·908.

Allied's Notice of Tort Ciaim I does not satisfy the statutory requirements of Idaho
Code § 6-907. Idaho Code § 6-907 provides as follows:
All claims presented to and filed with a governmental
entity shall accurately describe the conduct and
circumstances whieh brought about the injury or damage,
describe the injury or damage, state the time and place of
the injury or damage occurred, state the Dames of all
persons involved, if known, and shall contain the amount
of damages claimed, together with a statement of the
actual residenc;;: ofthe claimant at the time of presenting
and filing the claim and for a period of six (6) months
immediately prior to the time the claim arose. If the
claimant is incapacitated from presenting and fIling his
claim within the time prescribed or if the claimant is a
minor or if the claimant is a non-resident of the state and is
absent during the time within which his claim is required to
be f1led, the claim may be presented and filed on behalf of
the claimant by any relative, attorney, or agent representing
the claimant. A claim filed under the provisions of this
section shall not be heJd invalid or insufficient by reason of
an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature, or cause of
the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the
governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby.
Idaho Code § 6-907 (emphasis added).

Failure to provide the required elements in a Notice of Tort Claim is fatal to the
claim. Idaho Code § 6-907 allows for "inaccuracy" in stating the elements in a Notice of

Tort Claim, unless it is shown that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury
thereby. However, the Act docs not allow for the orr:ission of one of the five essential
elements. In I!!cking v. Board ofComm'rs of Jefferson County., 796 P.2d 1055 (Kan.
App. 1990), the court held that an omission rather than an inaccuracy in a Notice of Tort
Claim does not subs1antialJy comply with the notice requirement and requires dismissal
I

See Exhibit "8" attached to Affidavit of Darrin L. Murphey dated February 19,2008.
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of the case, Id. at l059. The claimant's request or demand for payment of mom:lary
damages is the very essence of a \vritten notice required by a Tort Claims Act Mesa
County Valley School Dis!. v. Kelsey, 8 PJd 1200,1205 (Colo, 2000). In Kelsey, the
court held that the claimant's failure to include the amount of damages claimed in her
Notice of Tort Claim was falal to the claim notwithstanding oral communications and
medical documents provided 10 the entity. Id.; see a/so, Wiggins v. Housing Authority,
873 P.2d 1377, ] 380 (Kan. App. 1994) (tort claim for retaliatory discharge was subject to
dismissal for failure to provide concise statement of factual basis of claim in Notice of
TOlL

Claim); C..l.S., Municipal Corporations § 829 (2002), and cases cited therein. The

Idaho Appellate Courts are in agreement. In Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho
587,887 P.2d J094 (Ct. App. 1994), the court held that where the claimant's Notice of
Tort Claim failed to make any claim [or interference with contract or prospective
business advantage, nor described the conduct and circumstances which brought about
the alleged injury, the Notice of Tort Claim failed to comply with Idaho Cocje § 6-907;

see a/so, Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, III Idaho 450, 452, 725 P.2d 155,157
(1986) (action in tort dismissed where notice of tort claim failed to Slate the name and
address of daimants, the amount of claimed damages, and the nature of the injury);
Friesen v, Cuff, Kootenai County Case No. CV -05-9047 (August 22, 2006) (plaintiff s
complaint dismissed for failure to describe injury or amount of damages claimed in
notice of tort claim).
The foregoing authorities make it clear that the Tort Claims Act allows for
inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature, or cause of the claim, or otherwise ..
Idaho Code § 6-907. However, a complete omission from the notice oflhe amount of
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damages claimed is fatal. Here, Allied has failed to describe any of the individuals
involved and has failed to describe the amount of damages claimed. The statute
mandates that the notice shali "state the names of the persons involved" and "shall
contain the amount of damages claimed." Id. Therefore, Allied has failed to satisfy the
requirements ofIdaho Code § 6-907. As such, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
on Allied's claims seeking damages for accepting credit card payment for bail and
operation of the Adult Misdemeanor Probation and pre-trial services program, or any

other tort.
It

This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction on Allied's Tort Claims on the
Grounds that A1lied has Not Allowed the County the Opportunity to
Evaluate its Claims.

Even assuming that Allied's Notice of Tort Ciaim satisfied the notice
requirements of the Tort Claims Act, Allied prematurely filed its complaint. Generally,
an amendment to the complaint relates back to the date the complaint was filed. I.R.C.P.
15(c) Idaho Code § 6-910 allows a suit to be brought only after the tort claim has been
denied.
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in
the district court against the governmental entity or its
employee in those circumstances where an action is
permitted by this act.

Idaho Code § 6-910. A claim is not denied until the County denies the claim or has failed
to approve or deny the tort claim within ninety days.
Within ninety (90) days after the filing of the claim against
the governmental entity or its employee, the govcmmcntal
entity shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of
i1s approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have
been denied if at the end of the ninety (90) day period the
governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the
claim.
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ldaho Code § 6-909.
Until A;lied has exhausted all statutory administrative remedies, this court lacks

subject maner jUnSdlction Park, ;43 Idaho at

,J49 PJd at 853. The cOU!1lacks

subject matter jurisdiction on any action covered by the Tort Clmms Act where the

pJaintifffaijed to comply with nolice requirements. !.Y1Eii~cn, ll6 ldaho at 779, 761 P.2d
at 436, "Thc no lice of claim requirement of IIdaho Codc § 6-906J serves the purposes of

providing an opportunity for parties to resolve their dispute through settlement without
resort to the cOUlis, allowing authorities to conduct a timely investigation of the
claimant's cause of action to determine the extent oflhe [county's] liability, ifany, and
allowing the [county] to prepare its defenses." Overman v. Klein, ] 03 Idaho 795, 797,
654 P.2d 888, 890 (1982) (ciling rafberv. State, ]02 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981»),
Here, Allied's Notice of Tort Claim is dated October 9,2007, (he same date

Allied fiied its complaint. Allied has failed to exhaust the requirements of the TorI
Claims Act by allowing the County the opportunity to evaluate Allied's claims ilnd then

respond. As such, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on Allied's tort claims.
C.

Allied's Claim For Damages Arising Out of Any Denial of Frank Davis's
Public Records Requests Fails to State a Claim.

Allied's Complaint for damages arising out of the alleged denial of public records
requests submitted by Frank Davis is statutorily precluded, ldaho Code § 9-343 provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
The sole remedy for a person aggrieved by Ihe d(m,iQLCf(a
request for disclosure is to institute proceedings in the
district court of the county where the records or some part
thereof are located, to compel the public agency or
independent public body corporate and politic to make the
in[Qrmation available for public inspection in accordance
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with the provisions of sections 9-337 through 9-348, Idaho
Code.
Idaho Code § 9-343(1) (emphasis added). No cause of action for damages is available.

2

As such, Allied's claim for damages arising out of the aUeged wrongful denial of Frank

Davis's public records requests, should be dismissed.
D.

Allied Lacks Standing to Protest the Alleged Denial of Frank Davis's Public
Records Request.

Allied lacks standing 10 lile a petition contesting any denial by Kootenai County
or Sheriff Watson of pub lIe records requests submitted by frank Davis. Allied's
Amended Complaint did not include uny attached exhibits. Even assuming Exhibits B
through K attached to the original complaint are the public records requests Allied is
referring to in its Amended Complaint, those requests were made by Frank Davis, not
Allied. Allowing an amendment of the complaint to name the real purly in interest,
pursuant to l.R.C.P 17(a) would be futile, as the statutory time period for filing a
petition, one hundred eighty (180) calendar days from the date of the mailing of the
notice of denial, has expired, and the action does not relate back

to

the datc the Complaint

was filed, as there is no evidence of a factual mistake in naming Frank Davis. See
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 92, 867 P.2d 960, 966 (1994). As such, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 12(b)( 6), Allied's cause of action eontesling [he deniai of public records should

be dismissed on the grounds that Allied has failed to allege facts that would give it
standing to bring a petition contesting denial ofpublic records.

As discussed below, Allied lacks standing to protest any denial of public records requested by Frank
Davis. Even assuming for the sake of ilrgumenl that Frank Davis timely filed a petition to examine records
in which defendants denied disclosure, the remedy is disclosure of documents, not damages. Additionally.
despite repeated requests by defendants, Frank Davis has failed to inform the defendants ofwhi~h ft!COrdS
he believes defendants have denied disclosure
2
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E.

Allied's Claims against Sheriff Watson must be Dismissed on the Grounds
that Allied has Failed to Comply with the Bonding Hcquirements of Idaho
Code § 6-6H}'

Allied has failed to comply with the bond requirements set [onh in Idaho Code §

6-610, which provides as follows:
(I) For purposes of this section, a "Jaw enforcement
officer" shall be defined as any court personncl, sheri ff,
constable, peace officer, state police officer, correctional,
probation or parole official, prosecuting attorney, city
attorney, attorney general, or their employees or agents, or
any other person charged with the duty of enforcement of
tbe criminal, traffic or penal laws of this state or any other
law enforcement personnel or peace officer as defined in
chapter 51, title ]9, Idaho Code.
(2) Before any civil action may be filed against any law
enforcement officer or service of civil process on any law
enforcement officer, when such action arises out of, or in
the course of the performance of his dUly, or in any action
upon the bond of any such law enforcement officer, the
proposed plaintiff or petitioner, as a condition
precedent thereto, shall prepare and file with, and at
the time of filing the cQ.!]1plaint or petition in any such
action, a written undertaking with at least two (2)
sufficient sureties in an amount to be fixed bv the court.
The purpose of this requirement is to ensure diligent
prosecution of a civil action brought against a law
enforcement officer, and in the event judgment is entered
against the plaintiff or petitioner, [or the payment to the
defendant or respondent of all costs and expenses that may
be awarded against the plaintiff or petitioner, including an
award of reasonable anorney's fees as determined by the
court.

(3) In any such civil action the prevailing party shan be
entitled to an award of costs as otherwise provided by law,
The official bond of any law enforcement officer under this
section shall be liable for any slIch costs.
(4) At any time during the course of a civil action against a
law enforcement officer, the defendant or respondent may
except to either the plaintiff's or petitioner's failure 10 file a
bond or to the sufficiency of the sureties or to the amount
MEMORANDUM [N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT - 13
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of the bond.
(5) When the defendant or respondent excepts to the
plaintiffs or petitioner's failure to post a bond under this
section, the judge shall dismiss the case.
(6) When the defendant or respondent excepts to the
sufficiency of the sureties [,} the sureties must be justified
by the plaintiff or petitioner. Upon failure to justify the
judge must dismiss the case.
(7) When the amount of the bond is excepted to, a hearing
may bc held upon notice to the plaintiff or petitioner by the
defendant or respondent of not less than two (2) nor more
than ten (10) working days after the date the exception is
filed, befure the judge u[ the court in which the action is
brought. If it appears that the bond is insufticient in
amount, the judge shall order a new bond sufficient in
amount to be filed within five (5) days ofthc date such
order is received by the plaintitT or petitioner. Jf no such
bond is filed as required by the order of the court, the judge
shall dismiss the action.
Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the court's tiles and records show that Allied filed its complaint naming
Sheriff Rocky \Vatson as a defendant on October 9,2007, and on October 10,2007, filed

a bond in the amount of $700.00, with one surety. After hearing on Sheriff Watson's
motion excepting to the amount of the bond, on March 24, 2008, the court entered its
Order Granting Defendant's Motion Excepting to Plaintit'rs Bond, requiring Allied to file
with the court, no later than fiye (5) days from the date the order is received by Allied's
Counsel, an undertaking with at least two (2) sufficient sureties in an amount not less
than $25,000.00, Allied subsequently filed a power of attorney which expires on june 29,
2009.

Allied's fiUng of a bond with the court after thc complaint was filed is untimely

and therefore docs not satisfy the requirements of Idaho Codc § 6-610. Additionally, the
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power of attorney filed by Allied does not satisfy the undertaking requirements required
by the statute, in that the power of attorney has an expiration date and the court has nol
received adequate surety, Idaho Code § 6-610 mandates that as a condition precedent to
filing any ciyil action, a plaintiff must file a bond, in an amount fixed by the court, Wilh
at least two (2) sufficient surdies, [daho Code § 6-610(2). The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that a pJaintiffwho did not file a pre-suit bond may not cure the defect, but must
suffer dismissal of his complaint. Monson

y,

Boyg, 81 Idaho 575, 582, 348 P,2d 93, 97

(Idaho 1959); Beehler v, Fremont County, _ Idaho _, 182 PJd 713 (Idaho App" April
14, 2008) ("Filing a written undertaking prior to initiating any civil action against a law
enforcement officer is mandatory;" "Dismissal in 1his circumstance is mandatory,")
Athav v, Stacey, 2008 WL 2437857, (Idaho, June 18,2008); Cf Johnson v, Boundary

School District No, 1OJ, 138 Idaho 33],336, 63 PJd 457, 462 (Idaho 2003)
(distinguishing the bond required for contesting a school district election from the law
enforcement officer suit bond, particularly noting that the language of Idaho Code § 6-

610 "expressly slates that the preparation and filing of the bond is a prerequisite to the
suit").

Here, the court's record shows that Allied failed to tile a bond prior to bringing
this action against Sheriff Watson, "Dismissal in this circumstance is mandatory,"
I3eehler, supra, Furthermore, the power of attorney filed by Allied does not satisfy the
mandatory undertaking requirements required by the statute, in that the pO'Ncr of attomey
has an expiration date and the court has not received adequate surety, 'n1erefore, the
court must dismiss all claims against Sheriff Watson,
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F.

Tbe Settlement Agreement is Void and Unenforceable.
The Settlement Agreement is void and unenforceable for failing

10

contain a

limitation as to time. Allied is attempting to enforce the parties Settlement AgreemenT,
dated April 19,200 I, as a covenant by the defendants nollO compele with Allied. See
Amended Complaint,: 8 ("Defendant has breached the Agreement by" "Directly
soliciting inmates to file cash or credit card bonds" and by "not ailowing arreslees access
to the phone to call a bonding company until after Pre-Trial Services has conducted

interviews with the arreslees"). A covenant not to compete is void and unenforceable if it
does not contain a limitation as to time, Jorgensen v. Coppedge, __ Idaho ___ , IS] P.3d
450,454, (March 27,2008), The Settlement Agreement does not contain any limilation
as to time, As such, the Settlement Agreement is void and unenforceable, Therefore,

Allied's claims arising out of the Settlement Agreement fail to state a claim,

G.

Allied Dues Not Have a Property or Contract Right in Any Specific Bail
Bond Business.

Allied has a license to conduct its bonding business, whieh is a mere privilege and
does not rise to the level of a property right or contract for any specific bail bond
business, See DBA Investments

Y.

State, 138 Idaho 348, 354-55, 63 P.3d 474 (2003)

(license is a mere privilege und is neither a right of property nor a contract, or a contract
right), Allied's claim against the defendants is no different than attempting to assert a
claim against competing bond companies for interference with economic opportunity or

prospective business advantage. AlJied is not entitled to any specific bond business or a
monopoly in general. Moreover, Allied's claim is speculative at best, requiring evidence
that [he pre-trial service participants and individuals paying a cash bail wilh a credit card

would have bonded with AJ:id. The law does not provide relief for such uncertain
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claims. See Harrington v. Hadd~ll, 69 Idaho 22, 27, 202 P.2d 236 (1949) As such,
Allied's claims arising out of any alleged diminishment in bonding business, fail to state
a claim.
H.

Allied Does Not Have Standing to Challenge the Acceptance of Credit Cards
or the Operation of Adult Misdemeanor Probation and the Pre-Trial
Services Program.

"It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to

invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing."

Gallagh~f

v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 668,

115 P.3d 756, 759 (2005)(citations omitted). To full111lhe standing requirement, Allied

must establish a peculiar or personal injury that is different than that suffered by the
public. Jd In Gallagher, the Supreme Court rejected Gallagher's argument that as a
smoker, he had a particularized injury not suffered by all tax payers, and therefore had

standing to challenge a cigarette tax. Jd
Here, Allied similarly lacks a particularized injury on its challenge to accepting
credit cards for bailor operation of the Adult Misdemeanor Probation Department and
Pre- Trial Services Program. As discussed above, Allied does not have a property or

contract right to any specific bail bond business, and its claim is speculative at best
Furthermore, neither Allied nor anyone else has been denied the constitutional right to

bailor bond. As such, Allied cannot show a particularized injury. Therefore, Allied
lacks standing to challenge accepting credit cards for bail or operation of the Adult

Misdemeanor Probation Department and Pre-Trial Services Program.
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I.

Idaho Law Does Not Prohibit Accepting Bail by Credit Card.
Idaho law expressly allows for the payment of a cash bail bond with a credit card.

Idaho Criminal Rule 46 authorizes the payment of bail in "cash". Idaho Code § 31-3221,
enacled on July], 2003, authorizes the district court to accept a credit card for payment

of a "cash deposit of bail".
(I) The clerk of the district court mav accept payment
of a debt owed to the court by a credit ('\'lTd or debi,!
card. '"
(2) Def1nitions. As used in this section:

(d) "Debt owed to the court" means any assessment of
fines, court costs, surcharges, penalties, fees, restitution,
cash deposit of bail, moneys expended in providing
counsel and other defense services to indigent defendants,
or other charges which a court judgment has ordered to be
raid to the court or which a party has agreed to pay in
criminal or civil cases and includes any interest or penalty
on sllch unpaid amounts as provided lor in the judgment or
by law.
(3) The supreme court lTlay adopt rules as deemed
appropriate for the administration of to is section and may
enter into contracts with an issuer or other organization to
implement the provisions of this section.
rd, (emphasis added).

Idaho Code § 31-3221 does not usurp any power from the jUdiciary, The amount
of bail is set by the court, and Idaho Code § 31-3221 does not conflict with that power.

Additionally, the Idaho Constitution vests the power to enacl substantive laws in the
Legislallife. Idaho Const. art. lll, § I. The right to prerlconviction bail is guarantecd in
both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Art I, § 6, of the
Idaho Constitution, and therefore a substantive right. As such, the legislature is vested
with the constitutional authority to enact legislation concerning the payment of bail,
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including the payment of bail by credit card. Moreover, [he Administrative Judge has
approved the procedures for posting bail with a credit card. As such, Allied's claims
challenging the acccptance oCa credit cards to post bail, fails

J.

10

state a claim.

The County's Operation of the Adult Misdemeanor Probation Department
and the Pre-Trial Services Program is Lawful.

Allied alleges that the county's operation of the Adult Misdemeanor Probation
Department is vV'ithout statutory authority and in violation of Article 10, § S, of the Jdaho
Constitution, and therefore the pre-trial services program is unlawful. (Amended
Complaint,

'1~

Il~unctjon,

pp. 4-5). Allied's argument is without merit. Aliiclc 10, § 5 of the Idaho

12-15; Memorandum in Support of Second Motion For Preliminary

Constitution addresses the powers of the state board of corrections concerning persons
convicted of a felony. See Idaho Code § 20-219 ("The state board of correction shall be
charged with the duty of supervising all persons convicted of a felony placed on
probation or released from the state penitentiary on parole ... "). Persons cODvieted of a
misdemeanor arc managed by the counties, not the state. See generally, Idaho Code § 18113( J) ("Except in cases where a different punishment is preseri bed in this code, every
offense declared to be a misdemeanor, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding six (6) months, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($ 1,000), or by
both.").
As recognized by Allied, the legislature has acknowledged the operalion of Adult

Misdemeanor Probation Departments by counties. See Idaho Code § 20-227(5)("In
counties where there are misoemeanor probation officers in addition to department of
correction parole or probation officers, those officers shall have the same authority

conferred upon department of correction parole or probation officers in this section, to
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arrest

11

misdemeanor proba,joner \vithollt a W?rrant for misdemeanor probation

violations occurring in the officer's presence as otherwise provided in this section"); and

§ 31·3201 D(providing for county misdemeanor probation supervision fee).
House Bill 408, which was signed by the Governor on March J 4,2008, and
effective on July 1,2008, not only acknowledges, but now specifically mandates county
commissioners to provide [or misdemeanor probation services, adding new sedions
designated as Idaho Code §§ 19·3947 and 31·878. Ofinteres( is the Statement of
Purpose whieh provides that the bill was developed and recommellded by the Department

of Corrections, among others. Also of interest is the Fiscal Note which slates that "While
this bill states that counties have the responsibility of providing misdemeanor probation
services, almost all counties are already providing such services." Tn any event, Allied's
challenge to the operation of the Adult Misdemeanor Department and the pre trial

services program, fails to state a claim.

V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendants respectfully request (hat the court enter an
order dismissing Allied's Amended Complaint.

DATED this

.1!~ay of Juiy, 2008.
Kootenai County
Department of Legal Services

BY~~
DARRIN L. MURPHEY
Attomey for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

3.1Jay

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of July, 2008, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Arthur M. Bistline
5431 N. Govemment Way, Suite lOlA
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83815

John P. Luster, District Judge
Delivered to Chambers

CJ U.S.MAIL

i' HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
l.J TELECOPY (FAX) to: (208) 676-8680
DARRIN L. MURPHEY

MEMORANDUM !N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMlSS AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2l
H \Sherln, DcpartmcnlV\l)ied Bail Bonds 20071A11ied. Memo in SUppOr1 or:Vlolio') 10 Dismils Amended COOlplalnl.doc

o

071

Rx Dare/lile

01-16-0S
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FROM-KC DISTRICT COURT

+1208405:188
+12084461188

POOl

T-551

P 0:/02

F-930

ARTHUR M. BTSTtll'lE
LAW OFnCE or ,A.RTtWR M, BISTLlNE
5431 N. Government Way, Ste. lOlA
Coenr d'Alene, 1D 83815

(208) 665·7270
(208) 676·86iW (rax)

CtLRK DISTRICT CUURT

Attorney fur Plamt'itT

IN THE OfSTRlCT COURT OF THE 'PTRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFTHE S'!'ATE Of
IDAHO, IN AND FOR
COUNTY Of KOOTENAl

nm

ALLIED BAlJ.. BONDS, INC" an 1<W1O

C\seNo.;NO' CV·07.7471

~

Corporation,

'SPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOnON

o DISMISS SECOND A.\1E.NDED

ICOMPLATNT AND MonON TO
rECONSTDER

VS.

COUNTY OF KOOTENAl. ~ p()liti~

subdivisIon ofthc State ofTdaho, ROCKY
WATSON, KDotenai County Sheriff. John ;md
Jane Docs 1 through 13,

i

Dl,'!fendilllt
COMES NOW, PI <!.inti ffby and tbrough its llnorney of r¢corcl. and responds to

Dd'aldan.ts' Motion !O Dismi:'$ Second Am~nd;:d Complaint and Morion to Reconsider as

follows:
Alll1nldllvil:> fih::d by Allied in tillS

maner ~e incorporated here as if set forth i..I'l full.

MOTtoN TO OISMiSS SSCONP AM.E:NDED COMPLAINT
A. Tht! Court f,Acks Sldbj~t Mgnsr JuLi~gi:;y!;m oD Allic9'~ "fr51Qos..:q Ncy.' q1Hnl s f9r
12Ml?ges.Ioi Fail ill.§: to COn'lp!x....with till! Tort Clilims AC't;.
AUitd'J' claims do not sound in (Orr, bur in contraCT and as an im~rrtsted tax pcryer
s!!~J;ing 10 prt!Vl!l'lf m~gaJ conduct

lulleQ's claim:;

R~SPONS~

aTl!l:

TO D£FENDANTS' MOTION TO

D1SMISS SECOND A.MJ::NPJW COMP1.AlNl'
ANP MOTION TO RT;CONSIDER

• I

o
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2) That Kootenai County is Kootenai County is illegally operating an adult misdemeanor

probation program; and
3) That the Sheriff"s practice of accepting credit cards for bonding purposes is illegal.
Allied's claims are not tort claims. The claims are based in contract and arc taxpayer suits to
stop illegal condue:! of public officials. The fact that the illegal conduct is financially harming
Plaintiff provides a basis for standing, bUl does not convert the action to one in tort. The Tort
Claims Act is nol applicable to Allied's claims.
To thc cxtent that Allied has any tort claims, and has in fact failed to comply ,vith the act,
that would only justify dismissing the tort claims, not any of the other claims or outrigh1
dismissing the entire complaint.
B. The C0U11 Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction on Allied's Proposed Amcndcd Claims for

Damijges on the Grow1ds that Allied has Not Allowed the Counlv the Opportuni1.Y..l.Q
EvaJ1d.i!.L~lts Claims.
This argument is also based on the Tort Claims Act. See section A above.

C. Allied's Claim [or Dama~s Arising Out of Any Denial of Frank Davis' Public Record
Request Fails 10 SLate a Claim.
Allied does not seek dam ages for the violalion afIdaho Code, Title 9, Chapter 3, other
thanfor attorneys fees,

D. Allied Lacks St.?-nding To Protest The Alleged DeI1illLQ[ Fral1k.Davi~'s Public Records
Request.

Frank Davis is Lhe president and owner of Allied Bail Honds. Inc., and was
requesting [he i!lj{mnalion in thai capacily, See Ajfidavit OJ Frank Davis.

E. Allied's Claims against Sheriff Watson must be Dismissed on the Grounds that Allied
has Failed to Comply with the Bonding Requirements on.c. 6-610.
The Court has granted All ied leave to file the amended complaint, and the County has
answered that Complaint. There was a bond in place prior to the filing of the complaint because
the original complaint is functus officio, and is not part of the record. Pacheco v. Sa/eeo Ins. Co.
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ofAmerica, 116 Idaho 794, 809, 780 P.2d 116, 131 (I989). The "Relation Back" Doctrine
speaks only to statutes of limitation and is not relevant here.
The County should have stood on its request for dismissal and n01 stipulated to the filing
of a sufficient bond. A sufficient bond has now been filed and the purposes of Idaho Code 6-610

have been fulfi.lled. Dismissing the action against Sheriff Watson would be a waste ofresources
and serve no purpose whatsoever.
F. The Settlement Agreement is Void and Unenf(w~eable.

Allied is not atrernpting to enforce the settlement agreement as a "covenanlnot to
compele" That is how the Counly is attempting to characterize the seulement
agreement. The County does not "compete" with bail bondsmen. The credit card
companies do.
If the County actually was competing in the bonding business that would be unfair as the
County would certainly have an unfair advantage given that its "customer" is in its jail and under

the complete control of its employees.
The County is not in competition with the bonding companies. A bonding company puts
its name and credit on tbe line. The County, by accepting credit curds, docs no such thing.
Allied's competition is the credit card company, a private enterprise, nol the County. By pushing
credit cards, the County is giving preferential treatment to one private enterprise to the detriment

of Allied.
"It is obvious that private enterprise, not so favored, could not
compete with industries operating thereunder. If the state-favored
industries were successfully managed, private enterprise would of
necessil V be forced out, and the state, through its municipalities,
would i~creasillgly become involved in promoting, sponsoring,
regulating and controlling private business, and our free private
enterprise economy would be replaced by socialism. The
constitutions of both state and nation were founded upon a
capitalistic private enterprise economy and were designed to
protect and foster private property and private initiative."
Village a/Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co.
82 [dabo 337, 350, 353 P.2e! 767, 775 (1960)
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
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G. Allic~.. Does Not Have A Property Or Contract Right In Any~ecific Bail Bond
Business.

No Propf!rty Right.
Thc County sites BllA Investments v. State, 138 Ida110 348, 63 P.3d 474 (2003) for the
proposition that Allied has no property right in its licenst:

(0

write bonds. Thc reliance is

misplaced.
The Supreme court in BHA noted that there is a property right in conducting your chosen
business citing Coeur d'Alene Garbage Service v. City a/Coeur dfAlene, 114 Idaho 588,591,
759 P.2d 879, 882 (1988), and held that BllA 's claim in that case was not a claim ha'>cd on the
denial of such a propcrty right. The claim was based on a taking of property without just
compensation because a transfer fee was too high. In dicta the Comt noted that a liquor license
is not a property right and cited a case specific to liquor licenses for such a proposition.
Allied is a bail agent. A bail agent is a licensed producer in the line of insurance that is
authorized by an insurer to execute or cowltersign undertakings of bail. I.C. 41-1038. A bail
agent must have a license,

I.e. 41-1039, and

must file a perfol1llance bond.

I.e. 41-1040.

As

such, Allied has the right and license to sell bail bonds and make a profit doing so and that is a
property right.

Speculative claim.
Allied may not be able to prove that anyone particular bond would have been written by
Allied if the jail had not accepted a credit card. However, it certainly can and has proved the
obvious -- that when lhe jail illegally accepts credit cards, or provides advice on bonding

decisions, or allows members of adult probation and parole access to alTestees to provide the
same advice, the total business to the bail bond industry decreases. Allied has now, and has [or

many years, a large percentage of that business so proving injury in fact.
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H. Allied Does No! Have Standing To Challenge the Acceptance of Credit Cards or the
Operation of Adult Misdemeanor Probation and [he Pre-Trial Services Program.
As a general rule, a citizen or taxpayer, by reason of that status alone, does not have
standing 10 challenge governmental action. Koch v. Canyon County, 177 P.3d 372,374 (2008).
However, if a taxpayer can show an injury that is not shared equally by all citizens, then the tax
payer has standing. Id citing Young v. Citv otKeEchum, J37 Idaho 102,44 P.3d 1157 (2002).
As set forth above, Allied is part of an exclusive group of individuals and entities which
are licensed to provide surety bonds for bail purposes. Utilizing credit cards and reducing the
amount of bonds creates a reductlon in the nwnber of bonds written and the amount of those
bonds. This results in injury only upon licensed bail bonding companies such as Allied. Allied
has standing to bring the claims.

1.

Idal10 Law Does Not Prohibit ACI:t:pting Bail Bv Credit Card.
Idaho Code 31-3221 does allow "debts to the Court" to be paid with credit cards, and

docs definc bail as a debt to the Court; however, section three of that statute specifically provides
that, "The supreme court may adopt rules as deemed appropriate for the administration of this
section and may enter into contracts with an issuer or other organization to implement the
provisions of this section." The Idaho Supreme Court was asked to speak and speak

j(

did;

credit cards are not authorized for cash bond purposes, Furthermore, only the Supreme Court
may enter into contracts with credit card issues, not the county as in this case.
J.

The COldI1tv's ORer~Jion of the Adult Misdyrncanor Probation DJadartment and the
Pretrial Services is Lawful.

As this Court already ruled, this is the proper subject for a summary judgment hearing.
This is a motion to dismiss.
in any event, the relevant Constitutional provision is not ambiguous and nol, {here/or,
subject to any interpretation other than what it says which is thaI the Department o/Corrections
is in charge of adults on probation - not the County.
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The County argues that Article 10, Section 5 of the Constitution addresses the power of

the state board of conections over persons convicted of a felony. The word felony appears
nowhere in tl1at Constitutional provision and it plainly states that the Board shall have
jurisdiction over adults on probation. Perhaps the framers of the Constitution saw the efficacy in
having

a uniform system for managing adults on probation, as opposed to an ad hoc county by

county system; in any event, the lEmguage of the relevant constitutional provision is not
ambiguous.
The Legislature may think that haYing the Counties manage adults on misdemeanor
probation is a good idea, but the framers of aUf State's Constitution did not. "Where the
Constitution, heing the supreme law ortlle state, forbids an act, no legislative enactment can
legalize it. And for this court to do other than to adhere strictly to the provision of the
Constitution would be an act of judicial lawlessness." Fluharly

\I.

Board afCom'rs o/Nez Perce

County, 158 P. 320, 322 (1916)
In order to interpret the Constitutional provision, this Court must first determine it to be
ambiguous. It is only am biguous if it is reasonably susceptible to conflicti.ng interpretations,

Arwoodv. Smith 143 Idaho 110,114,138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006). There is nothing ambiguous
about the language in question and it is not, therefor, subject to any interpretation other than what
it says. The Department of Corrections is in charge of adults on probation. Just because the
Department of Corrections is also in eharge of the penitentiary does not render the phrase "adults
on probation" ambiguous.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER
This Motion is based on its arguments pertaining to the Tort Claims Act and the bond
requirement. The arguments in tbe response sct fortb above are incorporated here.
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DATED this] 6 t \ day of July 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J/Ji-

I hereby certify that on the .f.{}L-; day of July, 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated hc:!ow, and addressed to the
following:
[]

Darrin Murphey
Kootenai County Department of Legal
Services
PO Box 9000
Coeur d 'Alene, ID 838116
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